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The history of the United States is a long history of excluded peoples
making arguments — sometimes more successfully than others — not
only about their fitness to hold formal legal citizenship or to exercise the
rights of “full citizens,” but also contesting the meanings of citizenship
and nation. Theoretical accounts of citizenship have reckoned with how
the efforts of outsiders have reconfigured the meaning of citizenship as a
social and political institution, altering the boundaries of citizenship’s
formal exclusions and inclusions. Today, citizenship is being reconstituted
in the same way. Immigrants are changing collective understandings of
citizenship through their own accounts, their stories, the very fact of their
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long-time residence, and the stories told about them. This article seeks to
cast light on the ways that immigrant communities may be
conceptualizing and reshaping collective understandings of citizenship in
the present moment.
Using information gathered in original interviews conducted in Southern
California over a four-year period ending in January 2018, this article
describes how harsh and uncertain immigration laws, significant swings in
executive policies toward immigrant communities, and blocked access to
citizenship have generated new understandings of citizenship and belonging
in those communities. In this contemporary context, citizenship is broadly
understood both inside and outside immigrant communities as a pragmatic
means to certain important, practical ends: freedom to unite with family
members and to travel, a legal right to work, and a guaranteed right to
remain in this country. But the practical benefits of citizenship are also
understood to be circumscribed, particularly when it comes to accessing
social welfare benefits and participating in social and political life.
Moreover, restrictionist immigration policies ironically have fueled a
degree of skepticism toward the loftier ideals of citizenship. When it comes
to political participation, some immigrants view citizenship as an
important guarantee of participation through voting, but many
immigrants already view themselves as politically engaged actors, even as
they view the formal political process with skepticism. When it comes to
welfare benefits, many immigrants seem to have a deeply internalized
sense that discussing citizenship as a means of accessing benefits actually
endangers potential access not only to benefits but to citizenship itself. And
while some view citizenship as a way to achieve social belonging, few
immigrants view citizenship as a guarantee of equal treatment. Many view
race and class as salient aspects of difference that will continue to generate
unequal outcomes regardless of citizenship.
This article contextualizes conversations with immigrant residents
against the backdrop of broader immigration enforcement efforts and the
ongoing (albeit sidelined) public debate over whether or not to grant
“earned citizenship” to certain long-time immigrant residents. What
emerges is a picture of immigrant communities highly attuned to the
practical benefits of citizenship status but acutely aware of the limits of its
power and highly sensitive to the costs that citizenship imposes.
Immigrants recognize the importance of citizenship’s legal protections, but
some long-term residents who have been systematically excluded from
citizenship also express a desire for forms of belonging more capacious,
more generous, and less exclusionary than U.S. citizenship seems to be.
These cautious and critical assessments point to the shortcomings of U.S.
citizenship — shortcomings that have become more pronounced in recent
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decades as citizens increasingly wield citizenship as a punitive tool of
exclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
Citizenship is an indeterminate and shifting concept. Theorists who
have wrestled with the meaning of citizenship fundamentally disagree
about its core components and acknowledge that citizenship’s
essential meaning shifts over time.1 On a practical level, the term
1 See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. COHEN, SEMI-CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 13, 14
(2014) (“[C]itizenship is both essential and essentially contested” and is “described in
many terms that are associated, variously, with statuses, actions, institutions, and
rights.”); PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS
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citizenship has been used to describe a number of different concepts.
It often signifies legally-bestowed nationality; that is, a rights-bearing
status guaranteeing a particular bundle of state-sponsored rights,
protections, and benefits. But it also refers to a performative status
associated with certain social, political or economic behaviors, and an
affective relationship to the state and its members.2
Discussions of citizenship in the realm of immigration law and
policy often and understandably focus on citizenship as formal legal
nationality. Immigration law is concerned with determining who can
enter and remain within the national boundaries. Citizenship law is
partially contingent on immigration law choices insofar as citizenship
law prescribes which immigrants can lay claim (perhaps immediately
and perhaps over time) to full juridical citizenship — thinly
understood here as legally-bestowed nationality.3 But debates over the
criteria of formal legal admission and formal juridical citizenship are
heavily driven by broader normative assumptions about and
understandings of citizenship.4 Choices about whom to admit to
citizenship and on what terms depend upon underlying and often
competing assumptions about the bundles of rights that inhere in
citizenship, the normatively desirable performative features of a
citizen, and the sufficiency of affective ties between a nation’s
members and those seeking membership.
Consequently, when citizens in the United States debate whether
there ought to be a “path to citizenship” for long-time U.S. residents
who currently lack legal status, they draw on their understandings of
the rights and privileges that actually flow from citizenship and of the
characteristics that make any one person deserving of such rights and
privileges. They rely on their assessments of whether certain
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 6 (2013). See generally JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-870 (1978) (discussing shifting conceptions over
time); KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 13-17 (2004) (same); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE
QUEST FOR INCLUSION 8-9 (1991) (same); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 14-16 (1997) (same).
2

See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 1, at 17-18, 36, 56.
The contingency is only partial insofar as citizenship law also determines access
to citizenship for individuals who never immigrate and who have no immediate,
relevant relationship to an immigrant. In the U.S., obvious examples are the children
of citizens who are granted jus sanguinis citizenship.
4 See generally, RUUD KOOPMANS, CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP (2005); GERSHON SHAFIR,
THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES (2014); DEBATING IMMIGRATION (C. Swain ed., 2007). As these
collections make clear, different people give different emphases to particular factors,
and they can come to widely divergent policy conclusions concerning citizenship even
when analyzing similar factors.
3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3627797

2018]

Citizenship Matters

5

individuals are capable of forming the requisite bonds with the
national community, and, relatedly, on whether existing members of
the imagined national community are capable of forming the requisite
bond with those seeking membership. Myths about the nation’s
composition and character, and about the meaning of citizenship
within this framework, do important work in shaping the practicalities
of debates over immigration and citizenship.
Throughout, citizens are usually depicted as the “deciders” of
citizenship — the gatekeepers of admission to citizenship in democratic
societies. Michael Walzer, for example, famously suggested that:
[a]ffluent and free countries are, like élite universities,
besieged by applicants. They have to decide on their own size
and character. More precisely, as citizens of such a country, we
have to decide: Whom should we admit? Ought we to have
open admissions? Can we choose among applicants? What are
the appropriate criteria for distributing membership?5
Notwithstanding
robust
theoretical
criticisms,
Walzer’s
understanding of the citizenry as the decider of admissions and (more
constrainedly)6 of naturalization criteria undergirds contemporary
discussions over immigration and naturalization policy. The implicit
assumption is that citizens ultimately will decide the criteria upon
which future citizens will be admitted.7 Insofar as one views
citizenship as formal legal nationality, and citizens as the authors of
the law that grants such nationality, this is true.
But this truth is also far more complicated than Walzer’s analogy
suggests. First, as Linda Bosniak has persuasively demonstrated, the
5

See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 32 (1983).
I say more constrainedly because Walzer explains that once an immigrant has
been admitted, that person should, in time, acquire a right to citizenship in a properly
functioning democracy. See id. at 60-62.
7 Walzer goes on to suggest that the citizenry has control over immigration
questions — that is, the questions about who gets to enter the nation’s territorial
bounds. That decision is a political choice subject to thin moral constraints. Id. at 62.
Once that decision has been made, in his view, choices about naturalization — that is,
about immigrants’ access to citizenship — are completely constrained in a just and
democratic society. “[E]very new immigrant, every refugee taken in, every resident
and worker must be offered the opportunities of citizenship.” Id. In fact, formal
democratic control over immigrant admission has been imperfect. To use Hiroshi
Motomura’s term, some immigration to the U.S. in recent decades has occurred
“outside the law.” Cf. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 4 (2014).
The fact that immigrants have arrived without formal admission to permanent
residence complicates Walzer’s descriptive account of the relationship between
immigration and citizenship policy.
6
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rights associated with citizenship often are not limited to citizens.8
Individuals can and do hold many citizen-like rights without being
legally admitted to the country, let alone being naturalized.9
Furthermore, cross-cutting and competing federal immigration
restrictions and rights protections, the interplay of laws in the U.S.
federalist system, and a host of “paralegal” practices significantly
complicate the legal lines and social status distinctions between and
among citizen and noncitizen.10
Individuals and collectives of individuals who are not citizens,
including individuals making claims to citizenship, also play an
important role in shaping the meaning of citizenship. Like any
applicant for admission, a person seeking citizenship can try to tell her
own story in a way that she thinks will best appeal to the relevant
admissions officer. She can also use her voice to try to reshape the
admissions criteria by influencing the opinions of individuals who
have the power to craft the rules of admission.11 These are the ways
that scholars usually conceptualize of the role of outsiders contesting
the bounds of citizenship.
But “outsider” influence is more complicated and far-reaching, again
belying the simplistic admissions analogy. Individuals seeking
citizenship are often fully integrated into the national social fabric, and
sometimes have deep and lengthy community ties that make it
difficult to think about them as “outsiders” at all. The stories they tell
about the meaning of citizenship — individually and collectively —
change what “insiders” think about citizenship. At the same time,
“insiders” tell their own stories to justify exclusions or incomplete
inclusions of long-time community members. Those stories reshape
the meaning of citizenship, too.

8 See generally LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006).
9 Id. at 94-95; see also COHEN, supra note 1, at 36.
10 See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. U. L.
REV. 709 (2015) (exploring the vulnerabilities of liminal legal subjects and noting
their imperfect overlap with formal citizenship categories). On paralegality in
immigration law, see generally Inés Valdez et al., Missing in Action: Practice,
Paralegality, and the Nature of Immigration Enforcement, 21 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 547
(2017). Valdez and her coauthors define paralegality as “the practices and operations
that constitute a dynamic system of actions and relationships that are not simply
linear applications of legislation or judicial decisions but may in fact extend or
counter these texts.” Id. at 547.
11 Indeed, Walzer does not foreclose this possibility himself, as is clear from his
discussion of the moral claims made by refugees, for example. See WALZER, supra note
5, at 49.
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The history of the United States is a long history of excluded
peoples making arguments — sometimes more successfully than
others — not only about their fitness to hold formal legal nationality
or to exercise the rights of “full citizens,” but also contesting the very
meaning of citizenship and the nation.12 Scholarly accounts of
citizenship reckon with how the efforts of outsiders have reconfigured
the meaning of citizenship as a social and political institution, and
have altered the boundaries of citizenship’s formal exclusions and
inclusion.13 Immigration law’s contemporary outsiders also are playing
12 Rogers Smith among others has observed the ways in which citizenship rules are
“crafted by elites, but elites acting in relation to pressure — sometimes violent,
sometimes economic, sometimes political and ideological — exerted by a wide range of
constituent and rival groups inside and outside the country.” SMITH, supra note 1, at 35.
The historical record on this point is robust. Individuals who were excluded from
citizenship entirely or who were nominally citizens but were barred by law from
exercising what they saw as important rights of citizenship have been deeply
influential in advocating for legal change. Many African Americans advocated for their
own citizenship long before it became a formal legal reality, and for their full
membership long after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment gave them formal
legal citizenship. Many women advocated for their right to “full citizenship” through
formal political participation. Many gay men and lesbians contested their exclusion
from military service and from the state-controlled institution of marriage.
The stories of their efforts illustrate the cynical tradeoffs often involved in the
process of claiming citizenship rights. Outsider groups sometimes have made their
claims to citizenship in ways that have pitted their own interests against those of other
excluded groups. For example, in order to gain access to the vote, white women
frequently traded on the potential rights of other groups. See generally Elsa Barkley
Brown, To Catch the Vision of Freedom, in UNEQUAL SISTERS, (Vicki Ruiz & Ellen Carol
DuBois eds., 4th ed. 2007); LORI D. GINZBERG, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: AN AMERICAN
LIFE (2009) (documenting Stanton’s racism and willingness to trade off the rights of
African American citizens to gain support for White women’s rights); ROSALYN
TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VOTE, 1850–1920
(1998) (documenting the ways white women suffragettes traded on the rights of
African Americans to secure their own political victories). Some have argued that
advocates for LGBT marriage equality have similarly traded off the rights of
individuals uninterested in marriage. Yvonne Pitts, Disability, Scientific Authority, and
Women’s Political Participation at the Turn of the Twentieth Century United States, 24 J.
WOMEN’S HIST. 37, 49 (2012) (noting how women used the mentally disabled as a foil
for the arguments in favor of their own enfranchisement); see, e.g., Katherine M.
Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 240
(2006) (arguing that the gay marriage movement has had liberty-depriving
consequences for those who do not order their relationships in ways analogous to
heterosexual marriage); Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 59 (2012) (same).
13 Indeed, most theoretical accounts of U.S. citizenship focus on the dynamics
created by outsiders seeking entry to citizenship or access to the purported benefits of
citizenship. See T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 78
(1965). See generally SHKLAR, supra note 1; SMITH, supra note 1.
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a role in remaking contemporary citizenship. Through their own
accounts, their stories, the very fact of their existence, as well as
through the stories told about them, they are changing collective
understandings of citizenship. Contemporary theoretical accounts of
citizenship need to grapple expressly with the question of how the
presence of a large, relatively stable and integrated unauthorized
population in the U.S. has reshaped and continues to reshape the
collective social meaning of citizenship.
Scholars previously have focused on the relationship between
immigration and citizenship to illuminating effect. Linda Bosniak does
so in her discussion of alien citizenship.14 Luis Plascencia does so in
Disenchanting Citizenship, his account of Mexicans going through the
naturalization process.15 Christian Joppke engages in a far-reaching
effort to theorize the relationship between citizenship and immigration
on a more global scale, looking to examples in both the United States
and Europe.16 Joppke boldly concludes that “citizenship’s internally
inclusive core has softened its externally exclusive edges. This is a key
development of the past half-century, in Europe and North America
alike.”17
But an analysis that centers the experiences and empirical beliefs
about citizenship and immigration held by residents currently
ineligible for citizenship illustrates the important corollary to the
claim that inclusive citizenship regimes have softened the exclusionary
edge of immigration laws. The experiences of long-term residents
outside of citizenship’s protections challenge us to think about how
immigration law’s increasingly exclusive external edge can decrease
the desirability and the protective capacities of the institution of
citizenship, even as it generates and hardens internal stratifications of
citizenship.18 The perspectives and experiences of noncitizen residents
illuminate the contingency of citizenship.
14

See generally BOSNIAK, supra note 8, at 34-35.
See generally LUIS F. B. PLASCENCIA, DISENCHANTING CITIZENSHIP: MEXICAN
MIGRANTS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING (2012).
16 See generally CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION (2010).
17 Id. at 31. Joppke notes the countertrend of restrictions on naturalization driven
by Islamophobia and by the (intertwined) re-ethnicization of citizenship, but he sees
these developments as anomalies in what he projects to be a long march to more open,
more fluid and perhaps less significant citizenship. Id. at 32.
18 Linda Bosniak previously theorized the U.S. legal regime as “hard outside, soft
inside,” arguing that although the law made it difficult to enter, once a person made it
through the tough external borders, citizenship and immigration status did not
impose hard barriers on legal and social integration. BOSNIAK, supra note 8, at 124-25.
The experiences of our respondents in the era that post-dates Bosniak’s analysis
15
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This article draws on original research to offer two contributions to
ongoing research on immigration and citizenship. First, the article
uses data collected from interviews with immigrants to explore the
practical reasons that citizenship matters in the U.S. today. The article
describes the self-identified harms and vulnerabilities that
unauthorized residents attribute to their lack of legal immigration
status and assesses how various policy proposal to improve their legal
standing would bear on these hardships. The discussion explores
temporary, liminal immigration statuses like Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) as well as more protective categories
like legal permanent residence. This discussion reveals the ways that
various forms of legal status can ameliorate some of the critical
problems that unauthorized immigrant residents identify as persistent
in their lives. At the same time, it highlights critical gaps between legal
status and citizenship — gaps that undermine the protective
capabilities of any legal status short of citizenship.
Second, this article uses immigrants’ descriptions of their own lives
in the United States, along with evidence from other academic studies
of immigrant communities, media coverage, and texts from ongoing
litigation and policy advocacy, to illustrate how unauthorized
immigrant residents in the U.S. are transforming collective
understandings of citizenship. Recent policy debates around
citizenship have cast citizenship denial as an appropriate and
proportional response to the perceived past wrongdoing of immigrants
who violated immigration law.19 Citizenship is withheld punitively,
and the extension of citizenship is held out, if at all, as an
incentivizing possibility for some subset of “deserving” immigrants.
Our interviews with immigrants and the organizations that work with
them suggest that this framing of the citizenship question shapes how
immigrants think about citizenship and how they couch their claims
to citizenship. As the expulsion of immigrants is both normalized and
prioritized, the protective power of citizenship is weakened. These
weaknesses are also internalized in our interviewees’ understandings
of citizenship.
In unpacking these arguments, this article proceeds in two main
parts. Part I uses information gathered in original interviews
suggests that as border controls move inward, this hardening of interior border
functions also impedes the integration of noncitizens into the social fabric and does so
in ways that affect the legal rights and social standing of citizens, too.
19 For a detailed discussion of this development in citizenship discourse, which
the author characterizes as a neoliberal turn, see Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned
Citizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 258-60 (2017).
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conducted in Southern California over a four-year period ending in
January 2018 to better understand the vulnerabilities experienced by
unauthorized immigrants in the region and the likely impact of
immigration reform proposals on these individuals. Unsurprisingly,
this discussion demonstrates that temporary measures like deferred
action are helpful but highly imperfect means to redress migrant
vulnerabilities. The discussion also explains why formal legal status
without citizenship, while more secure in many ways, has some of the
same shortcomings in protection as do more liminal protections like
deferred action status and Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”). To a
notable extent, access to citizenship is essential to stable inclusion. As
the protective benefits of permanent residency have declined, the
unique benefits of citizenship in this regard have only become more
pronounced.
But if citizenship is necessary to address the core legal
vulnerabilities experienced by immigrant communities, it is also
imperfect. And immigrants have a very clear sense of the limits of
citizenship. Part II explores how our interviews, in addition to
shedding light on the promises and shortcomings of various
legalization measures, also provide insights into the shifting meaning
and declining protective force of citizenship itself. Section A discusses
the rise of a new round of “citizenship worthiness” discourse that is
both embraced and resisted by immigrants and immigrant-serving
organizations in their self-presentation and activism. This discourse is
the natural product of a punitive citizenship policy that decouples the
material benefits of citizenship from the obligations and performance
of citizenship. Section B explores how these emerging notions of
citizenship worthiness interact with immigration enforcement policies
to fundamentally reshape collective understandings of citizenship,
fueling predictably striated hierarchies of privilege not just between
citizens and noncitizens but also among citizens. Section C discusses
the broader theoretical implications of these findings, suggesting that
in the U.S., exclusionary immigration policies and blocked paths to
citizenship do not act to uniformly increase the value of citizenship,
but rather, to make citizenship less valuable. Immigration law’s
exclusionary edges decrease the capacity of the institution of
citizenship to bring with it either material benefits or an affective sense
of belonging.
I.

IMMIGRANT VULNERABILITIES AND REFORMS WITHOUT CITIZENSHIP

The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that about 11.2 million
unauthorized immigrants are living in the United States — a number
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that has been stable for the past six years.20 Many of these immigrants
have been here for a very long time. The median length of residence of
the unauthorized population is over thirteen years.21
Despite the presence of a substantial and entrenched unauthorized
population, over the past twenty years, Congress has generated only a
tiny handful of legislative enactments that have created new pathways
to citizenship for these residents.22 Indeed, many paths to citizenship
were narrowed in a 1996 legislative frenzy. Laws passed at that time
significantly reduced the number of noncitizens who can gain
citizenship status through cancellation of removal23 even as they
20 JEFFREY S. PASSEL ET AL., AS GROWTH STALLS, UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION BECOMES MORE SETTLED, PEW RESEARCH CENTER. 4 (2014). That
population peaked at 12.2 million in 2007 and has since declined to about 11.3
million, where it has held steady for the last few years. Id. The population of
unauthorized migrants declined in response to a combination of factors including a
weakening U.S. economy, a growing Mexican economy, a substantial demographic
shift in Mexico, and increased immigration enforcement at the border, in the interior
and overseas. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 12 (2013).
Because over half of unauthorized migrants are from Mexico, it is significant that net
migration from Mexico has been negative.
21 See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S.,
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ (“In 2014, unauthorized immigrant adults
had lived in the U.S. for a median of 13.6 years, meaning that half had been in the
country at least that long.”).
22 Examples of the rare exceptions include the Nicaraguan Adjustment and
Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”), which created a pathway to legalization
and citizenship for a subset of Central American migrants, the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000, which created a path to legalization and citizenship for
qualifying victims of crime and trafficking, and the Violence Against Women Act’s
self-petitioner provisions, which provided a path to citizenship for family members
who might otherwise be at the mercy of an abusive relative who fails to file the
requisite paperwork. Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-110, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 2193; Trafficking Victims Protection, 22
U.S.C. §§ 7101-7112 (2018); 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (2018).
23 Cancellation of removal is a form of relief from deportation that is available
either to individuals who have at least five years of lawful residence and seven total
years of total residence (a form of relief known as cancellation part A) or at least ten
years of continuous physical presence (known as cancellation part B), provided the
noncitizen meets certain other qualifying requirements. Cancellation part B is
available to only 10,000 noncitizens a year and even then, only to those whose
removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for a qualifying
U.S. citizen relative. This is a much narrower form of relief than the broader and more
broadly available “suspension of deportation,” which was removed from the
immigration statute in 1996 and replaced with cancellation. Compare Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (repealed 1996) with contemporary 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b (2018).
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rendered deportable and ineligible for citizenship a substantial number
of lawful permanent residents with minor or old criminal
convictions.24 Some existing legal paths to citizenship were closed
completely.25
Federal legislative immigration reform proposals aimed at
addressing the plight of the unauthorized population and more
effectively managing future migration flows have stalled again and
again.26 One consequence has been an increased focus on halfmeasures to deal with the issue. These have taken the form of
proposals that envision a path to legalization with no citizenship, as
well as a host of interim measures that extend and even create forms of
liminal legal status for foreign nationals. These legislative and policy
developments are discussed in section A. Section B explores the effects
and projected effects of these policy proposals on unauthorized
immigrant residents.27 After a brief methodological overview,
subsection one identifies some of the vulnerabilities that immigrant
residents in Southern California attribute to their lack of legal
immigration status and describes their perceptions of how legal status
24 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act,
and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and
Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833, 838-43 (1997); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation,
Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1890-91 (2000) (explaining and criticizing the 1996
expansion of deportability and excludability); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive
Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99-100 (1998)
(contesting the constitutionality of the 1996 laws’ retroactive applications).
25 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2018). That section once allowed people in the
country without authorization to normalize their status if a visa became available for
them. Congress allowed that provision to lapse, and efforts to renew it have failed. See
also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2018) (imposing a ten-year bar on anyone
present without authorization for a year or more, thus closing off the possibility of
previously common out-of-country adjustment of status for individuals who marry
U.S. citizens or otherwise become eligible for lawful immigration status).
26 Seemingly viable legislation to achieve comprehensive immigration reform in
the middle of the last decade included the Immigration Reform Act of 2004, the
S.O.L.V.E. Act in 2004, and the Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act in 2005.
S. 2010, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2381, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 1033, 109th Cong.
(2005). More recently, S. 744 passed the Senate in the summer of 2013, but the House
of Representatives took no action on the bill. S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
27 A complete evaluation of immigration and citizenship policies would also take
into greater account the effects of the policies on people who are already citizens. One
of the limitations of the data set for this project is that it focuses primarily on the
experiences of unauthorized residents. Nevertheless, the experiences of citizens are
captured directly, in comments from the citizen advocates and attorneys who were
interviewed for the project, as well as indirectly, in the comments of the unauthorized
residents who speak about the experiences of citizens in their communities.
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could ameliorate their vulnerabilities. Subsection two maps these
identified vulnerabilities against the legal protections offered by
various immigration reform efforts and proposals. Unsurprisingly, this
section demonstrates that temporary measures like deferred action are
helpful but highly imperfect means to redress immigrant residents’
legally created vulnerabilities. Formal legal status without citizenship,
while more secure, shares many of the defects of liminal statuses like
deferred action.
A. Without Citizenship — The Rise of Liminal Legal Status
A majority of U.S. citizens appear to support federal legislative
reform that would provide unauthorized resident immigrants with a
means of normalizing their status and eventually becoming citizens.28
28 Regardless of wording, proposals to grant citizenship to unauthorized migrants in
the country generally attract broad support. One CNN/ORC International poll taken in
February 2014 found that about eighty percent of polled citizens believed that
unauthorized immigrants who have been in the country for years and are employed, speak
English, and would pay back taxes should be allowed to become citizens. Interestingly, that
same poll showed that nearly two-thirds would oppose a bill that “only granted legal status
but no way to achieve citizenship.” See Philip E. Wolgin & Evelyn Galvan, Immigration
Polling Roundup: Americans of All Political Stripes Want Congress to Pass Immigration Reform,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 4, 2014, 9:37 AM), https://www.americanprogress.
org/issues/immigration/news/2014/03/04/85102/immigration-polling-roundup-americansof-all-political-stripes-want-congress-to-pass-immigration-reform/; see also Tamar Jacoby,
Immigration Nation, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov./Dec. 2006), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/62090/tamar-jacoby/immigration-nation (“[A]n overwhelming majority [of
Americans] — between two-thirds and three-quarters in every major poll — would like to
see Congress address the problem [of illegal immigration] with a combination of tougher
enforcement and earned citizenship for the estimated twelve million illegal immigrants
already living and working here.”). Even after months in which heated anti-immigrant
rhetoric formed the primary axis of the presidential campaign strategy of Donald J. Trump,
a majority of U.S. voters polled still favor immigration and a path to citizenship for the
nation’s unauthorized immigrant residents. Tal Kopan & Jennifer Agiesta, CNN/ORC Poll:
Americans Break with Trump on Immigration Policy, CNN POL. (Mar. 17, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/17/politics/poll-oppose-trump-deportation-immigrationpolicy/ (“60% say the government’s top priority in dealing with illegal immigration should
be developing a plan to allow those in the US illegally who have jobs to become legal
residents. In contrast, 26% say developing a plan to stop illegal border crossings should be
the top priority and 13% say deportation of those in the US illegally should be the first
priority.”). These numbers appear to have held true into 2017, notwithstanding a
heightened wave of anti-immigrant rhetoric. In a 2017 CNN/ORC poll, ninety percent of
respondents answered “yes” when asked: “Now, thinking about how the U.S. government
should treat illegal immigrants who have been in this country for a number of years, hold a
job, speak English and are willing to pay any back taxes that they owe. Would you favor or
oppose a bill that allowed those immigrants to stay in this country rather than being
deported and eventually allow them to apply for U.S. citizenship?” CNN/ORC INT’L POLL 3
(Mar. 17, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/03/17/rel4g.-
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The Senate actually passed a bill in 2013 that would have achieved this
goal for some immigrants.29 Interest groups and political leaders that
had advocated for this path to citizenship agreed to a significant
expansion in immigration enforcement in exchange for it.30 The
.immigration.pdf.
A strange-bedfellow coalition — of business associations, labor unions, and the
Catholic Church, among others — has endorsed this position. See, e.g., Jennifer
Ludden, Strange Bedfellows Join Forces on Immigration Bill, NPR (Jan. 19, 2006, 7:22
PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5163862 (discussing the
alliance of unions and chambers of commerce). In Washington, support for
immigration reform that includes citizenship for long-time residents has spanned
party lines to include former Republican President George W. Bush and the late
Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.); indeed they were seen as partners in
immigration reform efforts during the Bush presidency. See Donna Smith, Senate Kills
Bush Immigration Reform Bill, REUTERS (June 28, 2007, 5:55 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration/senate-kills-bush-immigrationreform-bill-idUSN2742643820070629. On the Republican side of the aisle, support
for such reform proposals have come from party mavericks like Senator John McCain
(R-Ariz.) and more mainstream Republican politicians like former Senator Bill Frist
(R-Tenn.) with support from all but a handful of congressional Democrats. See, e.g.,
Massimo Calabresi, Why the Immigration Deal Flopped, TIME (Apr. 7, 2006),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1181547,00.html (discussing the
cross-party political coalitions built around immigration reform issues), Caroline
Kelley, Immigration Debate Brings Strange Bedfellows—And New Hope—to Washington,
TIME (Jul. 31, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/07/31/immigration-debatebrings-strange-bedfellows-and-new-hope-to-washington/ (same). Currently, there is a
deep political divide among Republicans about whether and how to reform
immigration, which helps to explain why the Republican Congressional leadership has
not brought a viable immigration reform bill to the floor for a vote in either chamber
since the Senate voted on one such measure in 2013. Ashley Parker & Jonathan
Martin, Senate, 68 to 32, Passes Overhaul for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/immigration-bill-clears-final-hurdleto-senate-approval.html; Deirdre Shesgreen & Eliza Collins, Immigration: GOP Divide
over Issue Could Have Far-reaching Implications for Ryan, 2018 Midterms, USA TODAY
(May 22, 2018, 2:52 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/05/22/
gop-divided-immigration-midterm-election/632467002/.
29 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013). The bill died in the House. See Philip E. Wolgin, 2 Years
Later, Immigrants Are Still Waiting on Immigration Reform, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(June 24, 2015, 9:05 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/
news/2015/06/24/115835/2-years-later-immigrants-are-still-waiting-on-immigrationreform/.
30 See Brad Plumer, READ: Senators Release Bipartisan Plan for Immigration Reform,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2013/01/28/read-senators-release-their-plan-for-immigration-reform/?utm_
term=.d4515477af0f; Wolgin, supra note 29. The 2013 bill included a near doubling of
immigration enforcement spending, to be used for increased border surveillance
technologies, physical fencing and detention structures, and more ICE and CBP
officers to carry out the expanded enforcement mission. See MIGRATION POLICY
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resulting compromises would have required the satisfaction of
enforcement goals prior to the initiation of any legalization efforts.31
Such concessions are a routine part of negotiations around
immigration reform; any future immigration reform efforts are likely
to include significant enforcement expenditures and programs.32
Notwithstanding the significant concessions made around
enforcement, the 2013 negotiations and compromises did not lead to
law reform. Throughout the 2016 presidential race, the idea of a wall
“paid for by Mexico”33 received significantly more attention than did
INSTITUTE, SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF THE 2013 SENATE IMMIGRATION BILL WITH 2006
AND 2007 SENATE LEGISLATION (2013), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/
files/publications/CIRbrief-2013SenateBill-Side-by-Side.pdf. Many immigrants’ rights
organizations supported the compromise. For criticisms of these compromises see
generally Angélica Cházaro, Beyond Respectability: Dismantling the Harms of
“Illegality,” 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355 (2015).
31 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013) (making the trigger for the Act’s legalization measures
contingent on the achievement of particular border security metrics). Or, as succinctly
summarized in the New York Times, “[t]he Senate bill provides a 13-year path to
citizenship for the 11 million unauthorized immigrants in the country, as well as
tough border security provisions that must be in place before the immigrants can gain
legal status.” Parker & Martin, supra note 28.
32 Recent debates around the DREAM Act highlight the point. DREAM Act
legislation would provide legal status and a path to citizenship for certain young
immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as children and who have met certain conditions.
See, e.g., S. 1615, 115th Cong. (2017). Support for such a measure is widespread. See
Chris Nichols, Do Three-Quarters of Americans Support the DREAM Act? Nancy Pelosi
Says So, POLITIFACT CAL. (Sept. 19, 2017, 5:36 PM), http://www.politifact.com/
california/statements/2017/sep/19/nancy-pelosi/nancy-pelosi-claims-three-quartersamericans-suppo/ (reviewing polling data and finding high levels of support).
Immigrant justice advocates have therefore argued that such a measure should be
passed without accompanying enforcement measures — a “clean DREAM Act.” See,
e.g., Support a Clean Dream Act, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://
www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-reform-and-executive-actions/dreamact/supportclean-dream-act/. To date, such efforts have stalled.
33 President Donald J. Trump’s immigration proposals on the campaign trail include
imposing a ban on all Muslims and building a wall with Mexico, paid for by Mexico.
Rebekah Metzler, Trump: Mexico Will Pay for Wall Because I Say So, CNN POL. (Aug. 5,
2015, 5:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/04/politics/donald-trump-mexico-wall-pay/;
Ed Pilkington, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslims Entering the U.S., THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7,
2015, 7:27 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/07/donald-trump-banall-muslims-entering-us-san-bernardino-shooting. The fact that more Mexicans are now
emigrating from the United States than immigrating to it has done nothing to dampen the
political demands for the ever-elusive migrant-proof wall. See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, More
Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 19, 2015),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/11/19/more-mexicans-leaving-than-coming-to-the-u-s/.
On the political appeal of walls, see generally Prathepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2
UC IRVINE L. REV. 147 (2012).
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mundane discussions over comprehensive immigration reform.
Ultimately, the candidate that espoused a position of mass expulsion
and extreme exclusions won the presidency, defeating the candidate
that espoused an immigration reform compromise. Although President
Trump’s campaign rhetoric would seem to take any possibility of
compromise off the table, the continuing significance of the tradeoffs
came to the fore again with the Trump administration’s rescission of
DACA,34 and President Trump’s suggestion that any relief for DACA
recipients would have to be accompanied by substantial increases in
immigration enforcement spending.35
As political compromises on large-scale immigration reform have
stalled, one political proposal has gained some traction among those
who oppose conditional grants of citizenship for certain unauthorized
immigrants — something they call “amnesty.”36 Opponents of
“amnesty” sometimes support reform packages that offer “legalization
without citizenship.”37 In exchange for heightened enforcement of
immigration law, some subset of the current population of
unauthorized migrants would be granted some form of legal status,38
34 See Carrie Johnson, Trump Rescinds DACA, Calls on Congress to Replace It (Nat’l
Pub. Radio Morning Edition radio broadcast Sept. 6, 2017). For a discussion of the
DACA program, see infra notes 56–70.
35 The messaging from the Trump administration has been inconsistent on this
point. See, e.g., Tara Golshan & Alexia Fernández Campbell, Did Trump Strike a Deal
with Democrats on DACA? This Is What We Know, VOX (Sept. 14, 2017, 12:30 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2017/9/13/16305690/top-democrats-announced-daca-deal-trump.
36 For a discussion of the problematic underpinnings, evolving meaning and
increasing political disfavor toward notions of amnesty, see generally Ahmad, supra
note 19.
37 This policy was supported by Republican presidential hopeful and former
Florida governor Jeb Bush in a book he co-authored on the subject several years ago.
See JEB BUSH & CLINT BOLICK, IMMIGRATION WARS 42-44 (2013); see also HOOVER INST.,
FACTS ON IMMIGRATION (2014), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/hoover_
immigration_fact_sheet.pdf (concluding that immigration reform is needed, but not a
new pathway to citizenship); Peter Skerry, Splitting the Difference, NAT’L AFF. (Winter
2013), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/splitting-the-difference-onillegal-immigration (same). Peter Skerry proposes “normalization without citizenship”
as an appropriate compromise position, citing low naturalization rates among
noncitizens regularized by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) as
evidence that long-term residents do not even want citizenship. Id. Of course, national
policies on integration have a significant effect on naturalization rates, so one could
just as easily conclude that more welcoming policies toward immigrants — including
a path to citizenship — could boost naturalization. See IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A
CITIZEN 141-43 (2006).
38 Existing proposals are vague about the precise legal contours of this status. For
purposes of the discussion in this subsection, we assume that it would resemble lawful
permanent resident status, but that assumption might be optimistic.
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but would not be provided with any new means of acquiring
citizenship.39 Advocates of legalization without citizenship argue that
this compromise would give unauthorized residents what they most
want — the ability to remain and earn a living — in a way that is more
politically viable than offering a path to citizenship.40
These proposals rest on a vision of citizenship as a reward for
exemplary behavior, and the denial of citizenship as a logical
punishment for outsiders41 because of perceived wrongdoing, no
matter how slight.42 Legalization without citizenship is a punitive
compromise: it achieves the goal of moving a large class of residents
— most of whom are constructed as racial outsiders — into a legal
status. But it does so in a way that penalizes the recipients of that
legalization with permanent political exclusion. Such compromises
sometimes envision the possibility of citizenship for childhood arrivals
39 See BUSH & BOLICK, supra note 37, at 42-43; Skerry, supra note 37, at 19-20. See
generally President Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Joint Address to Congress (Mar. 1,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpjoint-address-congress/.
40 It is not intuitively clear why this is more politically viable than citizenship, and
supporters of normalization without legalization do not explain why, beyond
intuition, we might conclude that this would be true. See generally Skerry, supra note
37. At least some polling data cuts the other way. See., e.g., Wolgin & Galvan, supra
note 28; CNN/ORC POLL, supra note 28, at 3. One might theorize that some sub-set
of political elites or politically influential groups might find more palatable a solution
that is less likely to create new voters who do not support them or their policy
preferences, but no systematic efforts have been made to figure out how significant a
voting group shares this view. The economic benefits of providing legalization without
citizenship also do not appear to be systematically evaluated. Again, the relative
economic superiority of that proposal is not intuitive.
41 The children of “insiders” — U.S. citizens — obtain citizenship automatically.
But for those who are not citizens at birth, different standards apply. See, e.g., Ahmad,
supra note 19, at 259. Because U.S. citizenship was initially conceived as something
available only to whites, and because the gradual expansion of the concept has been
marred at many points by racist exclusions, non-whites are often constructed as
“outsiders” to citizenship regardless of formal citizenship status. See generally IAN
HANEY-LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW 42, 61 (2006).
42 A search of websites reveals a mass of opinion pieces staking out the position that
“illegal immigrants” should not be “rewarded” with citizenship in light of their
lawbreaking. See, e.g., Peter K. Nunez, Opinion, Why Rewarding Illegal Immigration Is
Wrong, THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Nov. 29, 2017, 3:15 PM), http://
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sd-utbg-daca-illegal-immigration20171129-story.html. Indeed, the argument is often extended to birthright citizenship. See,
e.g., Don Tonty, Letter to the Editor, Birthright Citizenship: A Reward for Breaking
Immigration Law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
opinion/readersreact/la-le-1101-saturday-birthright-citizenship-20141101-story.html (“The
solution [to the problem of unauthorized migration] is to . . . stop rewarding the children
of illegal immigrants with citizenship . . . .”).
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whose initial immigration “transgression” is viewed as one for which
they are not culpable. But recently, even high-achieving childhood
arrivals have been included on the list of potential recipients of
legalization programs that provide no path to citizenship.43 Forfeiting
citizenship is the price that immigrants would have to pay for their
immigration violations.
To date, Congress has not enacted any of these reform programs.
Without legislative reform, unauthorized immigrant residents remain
vulnerable to deportation, and generally unable to normalize their
status. Contrary to popular rhetoric about “standing in line” and
waiting their turn,44 for most foreign nationals, there is no line to
stand in, and no legal status available.45 While this has not prompted
large waves of noncitizens to “self-deport” as restrictionists may have
hoped,46 it has generated persistent hardships and uncertainties for
those who remain.47
43 For example, the libertarian Cato Institute estimates that eighty-two percent of
DACA recipients would not qualify for citizenship under H.R. 6136, a proposed House
of Representatives immigration reform bill. David Bier & Stuart Anderson, 82% of
Dreamers Won’t Benefit from House Bill’s Citizenship Path, CATO LIBERTY (June 19,
2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/82-dreamers-wont-benefit-house-billscitizenship-path. Even that number is optimistically high, since their eligibility would
only be triggered by defined border security measures that seem unlikely to be
satisfied. Id.
44 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Third Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate (Oct.
13, 2004) (transcript available at npr.org), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=4108590 (“I don’t believe we ought to have amnesty. I don’t think
we ought to reward illegal behavior. There are plenty of people standing in line to
become a citizen. If they want to become a citizen, they can stand in line, too.”).
45 Why Don’t They Just Get in Line? There Is No Line for Many Unauthorized
Immigrants,
A M.
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
(Aug.
12,
2016),
https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/why-don%E2%80%99t-they-just-get-line.
46 Kris Kobach is one “issue entrepreneur” who initially popularized this term,
which gained more widespread prominence when used by presidential hopeful Mitt
Romney in his 2012 presidential campaign. See, e.g., Lucy Madison, Romney on
Immigration: I’m For “Self-Deportation,” CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2012, 12:44 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/romney-on-immigration-im-for-self-deportation (“‘The
answer is self-deportation, which is people decide they can do better by going home
because they can’t find work here because they don’t have legal documentation to
allow them to work here,’ he said. ‘And so we’re not going to round people up.’”). For
a discussion of the significant role of issue entrepreneurs in channeling general
concerns about economic and social precarity into an anti-immigrant agenda, see
generally PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & KARTHICK RAMACHANDRA, THE NEW
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2014). For a fascinating overview of the long history of
“self-deportation” policies as a settler colonial imperial strategy, see generally Teresa
K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
47 Advocates of self-deportation strategies underestimate the compelling nature of
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Congress has allocated far fewer resources to federal immigration
enforcement agencies than would be necessary to effectuate the
deportation of the entire deportable population.48 To balance the
prerogatives of the nation’s immigration laws with the realities of
limited enforcement dollars and humanitarian exigencies, the
executive branch, particularly under President Obama, increasingly
relied on a number of discretionary mechanisms short of legalization
to normalize the status of migrants who might otherwise face longterm exclusion because of their periods of unauthorized residence.49
The result has been the proliferation of liminal50 and twilight
statuses51 that have been extended by the government to long-term
residents lacking legal immigration status. Immigrants unable to
qualify for a visa or otherwise subject to exclusion grounds have been
allowed to remain in the country by executive designation. Sometimes
this exercise of executive discretion has been made pursuant to
specific statutory provisions, as when thousands of Salvadorans were
granted — and then periodically renewed for — Temporary Protected
Status (“TPS”) from the period following a major earthquake in 2001

the forces that drive migrants to move. To many migrants, immigrating to the U.S.
does not feel like a choice, and self-deporting to their home countries is not a real
option. See, e.g., SETH M. HOLMES, FRESH FRUIT, BROKEN BODIES 17 (2013) (“The ‘push’
and ‘pull’ factor school of migration studies tends to assume that labor migration is
entirely chosen, voluntary, and economic. However, my Triqui companions
experience their labor migration as anything but voluntary.”).
48 One study estimates the direct cost of such deportation to be over $100 billion.
See Ryan Edwards & Francesco Ortega, The Economic Impacts of Removing
Unauthorized Immigrant Workers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 21, 2016, 3:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2016/09/21/144363/theeconomic-impacts-of-removing-unauthorized-immigrant-workers/. Others place the
figure even higher. See BEN GITIS, THE PERSONNEL AND INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED TO
REMOVE ALL UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN TWO YEARS 1 (2016), https://www.
americanactionforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2016_Immigration_Update.pdf
(estimating a direct cost of $400 to $600 billion to deport all unauthorized residents
and prevent future unlawful entries).
49 See SHOBHA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 33-53 (2015) (discussing the long
history and wide range of discretionary executive relief in immigration law). See
generally STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTÍNA RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 443-53 (2014) (analyzing administrative remediation of various
immigration exclusion grounds).
50 On the rise and significance of liminal legal status both in and outside of the
immigration context, see generally Chacón, supra note 10, at 702.
51 David A. Martin, Twilight Statuses: A Closer Examination of the Unauthorized
Population, 2 POL’Y BRIEF 1, 2 (2005) (defining and cataloguing these twilight statuses);
see also MOTOMURA, supra note 7, at 25-31 (same).
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through 2018.52 At other times, such discretion is exercised on a more
individualized basis, as when an individual is granted humanitarian
parole pursuant to the immigration statute.53 And at other times, the
decision made by the executive branch is not explicitly authorized by
statute and instead represents an exercise of discretion based on
individual equities, as in some instances when an immigration judge
administratively closes a case.54
President Obama presided over a significant expansion in these
liminal categories. His administration first aggressively expanded
immigration enforcement efforts,55 but then attempted to mitigate the
harsh effects on long-term residents without legal status through a
variety of measures, including two executive programs designed to
offer a temporary reprieve for some of those individuals. The first of
these programs, successfully initiated in the summer of 2012, was

52 The criteria for TPS protection is contained at Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)-(2) (2018); see also Temporary Protected Status Designated
Country: El Salvador, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/temporary-protected-status/temporary-protected-status-designated-countryel-salvador (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (outlining criteria for renewal). For a discussion of
the impact of the Trump administration’s recent decision to end TPS for Salvadorans, see,
e.g., Jesse Acevedo, What Will Happen to El Salvador When the U.S. Ends the Protected Status
of Salvadoran Immigrants?, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/22/salvadorans-will-lose-tps-statusheres-how-this-may-impact-the-countrys-march-elections/. A federal district court judge
recently enjoined the Trump administration’s decision to end TPS for Salvadorans as well
as Haitians, Sudanese nationals and Nicaraguans, finding that the administration’s decision
reflected impermissible racial animus toward these groups in violation of the Constitution.
Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Ramos v. Nielson, No. 18-cv01554-EMC (N.D.C.A. Oct. 10, 2018). For a detailed analysis of immigrants’ experience
living as TPS designees, see generally Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and
Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999 (2006).
53 Humanitarian parole is statutorily authorized under Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018). For a discussion of the application process,
see Humanitarian Parole, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://my.uscis.gov/
exploremyoptions/humanitarian_parole/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
54 Attorney General Jefferson Sessions has indicated his opposition to, and plans
to limit, this discretionary use of case closures. Terry Carter, Sessions to Challenge
Immigration Judges Over Closure of Cases, ABA J. (Jan. 5, 2018), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/sessions_to_challenge_immigration_judges_over_closure
_of_cases (discussing Attorney General Sessions’ review of administrative closure and
noting that there are approximately 350,000 administratively closed cases potentially
affected by this review).
55 MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 20, at 16-22 (describing and quantifying
enforcement expansion); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit,
130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 245-54 (2017) (providing a brief overview of Obama-era
enforcement efforts).
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DACA.56 DACA de-prioritized for removal certain qualifying
noncitizens unlawfully present in the United States since childhood.
Their designation as recipients of “deferred action” also triggered the
statutory and regulatory authorization of work permits57 and driver’s
licenses.58 More than 800,000 individuals received deferred action
under the program.59 President Trump announced the rescission of the
program on September 5, 2017, only giving recipients whose deferred
action was set to expire by March 6, 2018, one additional month to
apply for a two-year DACA renewal.60 But two federal district courts
then enjoined this rescission, requiring the Trump administration to
continue to accept applications for renewal;61 another court went even
further, issuing a decision that could eventually require the
administration to accept new applications.62 Thus, as of this writing,
the program remains tenuously in effect by judicial order.63
56 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Security, for David V.
Aguilar et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came
to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[hereinafter Napolitano, DACA Memorandum].
57 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2014). See generally
Paul Wickham Schmidt, Employment Authorization for Aliens: Part I, 89 IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 1 (May 1989). DACA applicants were required to submit simultaneous
applications to DHS for work authorization, and indeed, the work authorization
application constituted the bulk of the DACA fee, accounting for $395 of the $465
price tag. This must be paid with each application for renewal, currently required once
every two years.
58 The availability of driver’s licenses for individuals who receive deferred action is
governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. 2, § 202, 119
Stat. 231, 312-13 (2005). Most states have structured their driver’s license laws to
track these federal categories of individuals eligible to receive a driver’s license.
59 Number of Form I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,
by Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/
Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/
DACA/daca_performancedata_fy2017_qtr4.pdf.
60 See, e.g., Mike Lillis et al., Trump Rescinding DACA Program, HILL (Sept. 5, 2017,
11:12 AM), http://thehill.com/latino/348848-sessions-says-DACA-to-end-in-six-months.
61 New York v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-5228-NGG-JO, at 6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2018),
https://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20180213/nyvtrump—dacaPIopinion.
pdf; Regents of the University of California v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:C 17-cv05211-WHA, at 48 (N.D.C.A. Jan. 9, 2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/4345906/1-9-18-DACA-Opinion.pdf.
62 NAACP v. Trump, No. 1:17cv-02325-JDB, at 49 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2018), https://
assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4446318/Microsoft-Princeton-Daca-20180424.pdf.
63 Texas and several other states filed a suit in the Southern District of Texas,
before Judge Hanen, seeking an injunction of the DACA program. Texas v. United
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The second Obama-era deferred action program, which never went
into effect, included both the expanded DACA (“DACA+”) and the
Deferred Action for Parents of U.S. Citizens and Lawful Permanent
Residents (“DAPA”)64 programs. DACA+ would have expanded the
age range of eligible DACA recipients and DAPA would have extended
deferred action to qualifying parents of U.S. Citizens and lawful
permanent residents (“LPRs”).65 In February 2015, U.S. District Court
Judge Andrew Hanen ruled that the DAPA and DACA+ violated the
Administrative Procedure Act and enjoined them.66 (The order did not
affect the initial DACA program, except in a limited and technical way
relating to renewals.) In May 2015, the Fifth Circuit denied the
government’s motion to stay that decision,67 and in November 2015,
went on to affirm District Court Judge Hanen’s ruling on the merits.68
That decision was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court on

States, No. 1:18-cv-00068 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 2018), https://www.scribd.com/
document/377929932/TX-v-USA-Re-DACA-Complaint-050118#from_embed. Because
Judge Hanen previously enjoined the DAPA program, it was widely believed that he
would be receptive to the states’ claims, setting up a split among courts. See Laura
Brubaker Calkins, Texas’s DACA Challenge Sets Up Supreme Court Showdown, BLOOMBERG
(May 2, 2018, 2:17 PM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-02/texas-sdaca-challenge-sets-up-supreme-court-dreamer-showdown. But Judge Hanen declined the
states’ request for an injunction, while signaling his doubts about its legality. Texas v.
United States, No. 1:18-CV-00068, 2018 WL 4178970 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018).
64 The program was originally known as “Deferred Action for Parental
Accountability,” which is why it is abbreviated as DAPA. The abbreviation has
survived even as the program name has morphed.
65 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Leon
Rodriguez et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children and With Respect to Certain Individuals Who
Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.
pdf [hereinafter Johnson, DAPA Memorandum].
66 Texas v. United States (Texas I), 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 643-44 (S.D. Tex. 2015);
see also Texas v. United States (Texas II), No. B-14-cv-254, 2015 WL 1540022, at *8
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2015) (denying motion for stay pending appeal). Judge Hanen also
issued an unusual “supplemental order” without any request for such by the parties.
Supplemental Order, Texas v. United States (Texas III), No. B-14-cv-254 (S.D. Tex.
May 8, 2015), http://klhn.co/Texas-v-US-SDTex-ECF-248. For a critical analysis of
these orders, see Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and
the Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 58,
63-65 (2015). For a favorable assessment of Judge Hanen’s decision, see Michael W.
McConnell, Why Obama’s Immigration Order Was Blocked, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-mcconnell-why-obamas-immigration-order-wasblocked-1424219904?mg=com-wsj.
67 Texas v. United States (Texas IV), 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015).
68 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
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June 23, 2016, in a one-line per curium opinion.69 Before the district
court ruled on the merits of the case, the Department of Homeland
Security rescinded the program.70
The Obama administration’s announcement of these programs
changed the lives of DACA recipients significantly.71 This broad use of
executive discretion also offered a tantalizing but unfulfilled promise
to do the same for DAPA-eligible noncitizens. Consequently, the
period of time beginning with the announcement of DAPA and ending
with the Trump administration’s efforts to rescind DACA provided a
unique moment in which to explore how unauthorized immigrant
residents perceive the differences between temporary relief from
deportation, various forms of legal residency, and citizenship.
B. Immigrant Vulnerabilities
In developing the account of legal status and citizenship that
follows, we draw on interviews that we conducted in Southern
California over the course of four years, between January 2014 and
January 2018. Our original plan, which now seems naively optimistic,
was to follow noncitizens and immigrant-serving organizations during
the implementation of comprehensive immigration reform (“CIR”).
When CIR failed to make its way through Congress, we hoped to pivot
toward the study of Obama’s expanded deferred action policies (DAPA
and DACA+), which we had anticipated could occur as early as the
summer of 2014. In fact, the period of our study coincided not with
the roll-out of these programs, but with the delayed announcement
69

United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
On June 15, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security rescinded DAPA.
Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rescission of Memorandum Providing for
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”)
(June 15, 2017), https://www.aila.org/infonet/dhs-rescission-of-memorandum-for-dapa.
71 Roberto G. Gonzales & Veronica Terriquez, How DACA Is Impacting the Lives of
Those Who Are Now DACAmented: Preliminary Findings from the National
UnDACAmented Research Project, IMMIGR. POL. CTR. (Aug. 2013), https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/daca_final_ipc_csii_1.pdf;
Caitlin Patler & Jorge Cabrera, From Undocumented to DACAmented: Benefits and
Limitations of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Program, Three Years
Following its Announcement, 27 UCLA INST. FOR RES. ON LABOR & EMP. 5 (May 2015),
http://www.irle.ucla.edu/publications/documents/ResearchBrief27Patler_000.pdf; Tom
K. Wong et al., Undocumented No More: A Nationwide Analysis of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, CTR. FOR AM. PROG. 10 (Sept. 2013), https://cdn.
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/DACAReportCC-2-1.pdf.; Tom K.
Wong & Carolina Valdivia, In Their Own Words: A Nationwide Survey of Undocumented
Millennials (Ctr. Comp. Immigr. Stud., Working Paper No. 191, 2014),
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt1db6n1m2/qt1db6n1m2.pdf.
70
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and ultimately, the injunction of these programs.72 As a result, the
period of the study was characterized by unexpectedly high levels of
legal uncertainty over the potential availability and scope of DACA+
and DAPA, as well as heightened concern among DACA recipients and
their allied community members about the stability of the DACA
program. This uncertainty, in turn, unfolded against the backdrop of
significant legislative change at the state level in California,73
continued legislative gridlock at the federal Congressional level74 and
exceptionally vitriolic debate about “illegal immigration” at the
national level, with the ultimately victorious presidential candidate
promising to build a wall on the southern border (paid for by
Mexico),75 to “immediately terminate” the DACA program,76 and to
deport everyone currently present in the country without
authorization.77
We initially selected Los Angeles County and Orange County as
sites for our research because while both counties have sizable
immigrant and unauthorized immigrant populations, they also present
important variations in their histories as immigrant destinations, the
size and composition of their immigrant populations, the attitudes of
72

See discussion of Texas litigation, supra Part I.A.
Legislative reform in California included the passage of SB 1310 (creating CAL.
PENAL CODE § 18.5 (2018), which made 364 days the maximum sentence for a
misdemeanor, ensuring that many California misdemeanors will not meet the 365-day
sentence required for many crimes to be “aggravated felonies” for purposes of the
immigration statute); A.B. 60, 2013 State Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013)
(authorizing the issuance of driver’s licenses to qualified unauthorized immigrant
residents); and A.B. 4, 2013 State Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), known
as the TRUST Act (restricting state and county officials to cooperate with ICE beyond
the requirements of federal law).
74 See Will Dunham, U.S. House Speaker Ryan Rules Out Work with Obama on
Immigration, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2015, 5:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usacongress-ryan-immigration-idUSKCN0SQ1V920151101.
75 See Time Staff, Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech, TIME
(June 16, 2015), http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.
76 See Anu Joshi, Donald Trump and DACA: A Confusing History, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 7, 2017, 3:52 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-anddaca-a-confusing-history_us_58b9960be4b0fa65b844b24a (noting Trump’s pledge to
end DACA and his later apparent about-face).
77 See David A. Graham, Has Trump Kept His Campaign Promises?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 28,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/trump-promises-cheat-sheet/
507347/#Table%20of%20contents (“Trump’s specific ideas about deportations fluctuated
at points during the campaign. At the bare minimum, he said he would deport two million
undocumented immigrants who are criminals who are in the country now (experts say that
figure is exaggerated). He has at other times said he would mount a mass-deportation effort
to expel all unauthorized immigrants.”).
73
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their law enforcement officials, and the availability of resources for
immigrants.78 We selected organizations in each of these jurisdictions
that provided services and support to immigrant communities. We
started with six organizations — three in each county — but our
research ultimately led us to interview staff from fifteen different nongovernmental organizations (including several that were offshoots of
organizations that we had targeted at the outset). Five of these
organizations are primarily legal services providers, four offer legal
services along with social services and community organizing support,
and the remaining six focus primarily on social services and
community organizing support. About half are membership-focused;
the remaining organizations provide fee-based and pro bono services
to all who seek assistance.79 Ultimately, our research team conducted
in-depth interviews during this period with forty-two advocates and
staff members of these immigrant-serving organizations (most of
whom were themselves immigrants and six of whom were interviewed
two or more times) as well as with two lawyers from area public
defenders offices. Using our respondent organizations as nodes, we
reached out to the clients and constituents of these organizations.80 In
addition to the staff interviews, we conducted wide-ranging, semistructured interviews with seventy-three immigrants in the Los
Angeles and Orange County areas who were either out of status or
covered by the initial DACA program. We interviewed twenty of these
individuals two or more times over the course of the period discussed
in this paper.81
We sought to broadly understand how legal uncertainty affects
immigrants and the organizations that work for and with them and
how various intermediaries (including state and local government
78 For further discussion on Los Angeles County and Orange County as
contrasting jurisdictions for the purposes of this research, see SAMEER M. ASHAR ET AL.,
NAVIGATING LIMINAL LEGALITIES ALONG PATHWAYS TO CITIZENSHIP: IMMIGRANT
VULNERABILITIES AND THE ROLE OF MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS 11-12 (2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733860.
79 We have kept the names of our focus organizations confidential to ensure
candid conversations with leadership and staff members.
80 All of our respondents were identified through their contacts with one of six of
our respondent organizations, three of which were in Los Angeles, two in Orange
County, and one in both. Because the central motivation for our initial research
project was to provide a full account of how organizations help noncitizens navigate
periods of legal uncertainty, our sample only includes noncitizens who have some
contact with an immigrant-serving organization in Southern California, either directly,
or at one degree of separation.
81 Ultimately, this and other research papers from the project will be woven
together into a book manuscript that analyzes the data from the entire period of study.
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bureaucracies and employees, legal service providers, and
nongovernmental organizations) shape the experiences of immigrant
residents. Many of the questions we asked were intended to provide
information about whether and how respondents had been or might
be affected by the kinds of temporary and contingent legal reprieves
offered by DACA, DACA+, and DAPA, but with attention to the legal
and social context in which they were situated. About a quarter of our
immigrant respondents82 were DACA recipients. Another quarter
likely would have been eligible for relief under the DACA+ and DAPA
programs announced by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson
in November 2014. The remainder seemed to be ineligible for relief
under either existing programs or the proposed DAPA program. We
intentionally structured our questions in ways that would allow
respondents to speak to a range of discretionary executive actions
around immigration, including increased enforcement, as well as other
forms of discretionary immigration relief like the U visas,83 asylum
relief, and family-based petitions.
Our interview questions were designed to provide information on a
variety of substantive issues.84 Only at the very end of our first-round
82 Many members of the organizational staff that we interviewed were also
immigrants, but here we are focusing on individuals who were not paid staff members
of organizations.
83 U visas provide legal nonimmigrant status to qualifying crime victims who
cooperate with law enforcement efforts. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (2018). U visa applicants are eligible for a nonimmigrant visa and are
ultimately eligible to adjust to lawful permanent resident status if they meet the
statutory requirements. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2018).
Ultimately, as LPRs, they can naturalize as citizens. See Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1445 (2018). In one of the handful of statutory mentions of deferred
action in federal immigration law, the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that
U visa applicants are entitled to deferred action while they await adjudication of their
U visa application, even if their applications for a stay of removal pending the U visa
process is denied. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C § 1227 (2018)
(providing that DHS may grant stay of removal to applicants for T or U visas but that
denial of a stay request “shall not preclude the alien from applying for . . . deferred
action”).
One of our respondents was pursuing a U visa, and others were potentially eligible.
One organizational legal service provider noted that the number of individuals in Los
Angeles who technically met the U visa eligibility requirements was extraordinarily
high. Interview with Gerarda, Legal Services Provider, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Sept. 25,
2014) (transcript on file with author) (“[I]t just seems like everyone in LA qualifies
for the forms of relief that I manage [U visas].”).
84 Our questions sought responses on a number of inter-related themes, including
the impact of local law enforcement practices on the operations and efficacy of
immigrant-serving organizations and on the lives of their clients and constituents; the
challenges posed by legal uncertainty for organizations that both organize and provide
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interviews did we explicitly ask the respondents whether they desired
U.S. citizenship and invited them to explore the reasons for their
responses. That portion of the interview generated some additional
insights that are explored further in Part II. Here, we focus on the
question of which vulnerabilities were most salient to our interview
participants and how they thought law reform could ameliorate those
vulnerabilities.
Although our respondents are reasonably representative of the
unauthorized population in terms of their age, national origin and
length of time in the U.S., even the most precisely selected sample of
this small size and limited geographic range could not be truly
representative of the national unauthorized immigrant population.
Accordingly, the discussion that follows is not intended to represent
the views of “unauthorized immigrants in the U.S.” in general. In
making general claims, this section triangulates the information
gathered from our respondents with the growing literature focused on
the U.S. immigrant population. Standing on their own, our interviews
illustrate how in-depth conversations with immigrants living without
formal legal status in the U.S. can provide a better understanding of
the likely effects that law reform proposals will have on affected
populations.
1.

Assessing the Vulnerabilities of Unauthorized Status

Many unauthorized residents have had a great deal of time to reflect
on how their lack of lawful status has affected them and to imagine
what life would be like if they were granted legal status or citizenship.
They also are able to compare their status to that of friends and
relatives who have been able to acquire status.85 Moreover, they have
lived through periods of heightened excitement and uncertainty,
which in itself has encouraged reflection.
When asked to identify the most salient challenges that legal status
created for our interviewees, the most frequently recurring answers
included: impediments and threats to family unity; restrictions on
freedom of movement; limitations on work and educational
opportunities; constant fear of deportation; and harm to social
standing. Several older respondents also mentioned access to health
care. This section discusses each of these vulnerabilities in turn. On
direct services associated with executive relief; and the racial identity formation that
occurs around immigration enforcement in periods of legal instability.
85 SUSAN COUTIN, LEGALIZING MOVES: SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS’ STRUGGLE FOR U.S.
RESIDENCY 68 (2000).
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the topic of how the lack of legal status affects them, the substantial
similarity in answers given by respondents regardless of age, national
origin, education level and length of time in the county is striking.
Their answers are also consistent with information obtained in
interviews by other scholars doing research in immigrant
communities, including by those doing large-scale empirical surveys.86
a.

Impediments and Threats to Family Unity

Without exception, every single noncitizen respondent interviewed
mentioned separation or fear of separation from family members as an
effect of their lack of legal status, and for almost all respondents, it was
an enduring and significant hardship.
Many mentioned their inability to be present at or after the death of
a loved one. Beatriz, a sixty-three-year-old Peruvian woman who
overstayed her tourist visa nearly eight years earlier, told us “My mom
passed away not too long ago. This situation of being in the country
‘informally’ is very emotional. And my mom, through Skype, she
wait[ed] to hear my voice in order to close her eyes. I would have
gone if I could.”87 Like Beatriz, Oralia told the story of being unable to
be with her father in Guatemala when he died.88 Alondra described her
sorrow at being unable to attend relatives’ funerals: “My father died of
cancer and my husband’s mother also died of cancer in Peru. In both
cases we could not go see them. The impotence of knowing that they
were struggling and not being near them, the inability to say goodbye
86 See, e.g., Leisy J. Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani, Incomplete Inclusion: Legal
Violence and Immigrants in Liminal Legal Statuses, 37 L. & POL’Y 265, 266 (2015);
Leisy J. Abrego & Cecilia Menjívar, Immigrant Latina Mothers as Targets of Legal
Violence, 37 INT’L J. SOC. FAM. 9, 11-14 (2011); Gonzales & Terriquez, supra note 71,
at 2; Patler & Cabrera, supra note 71, at 4-5; Wong et al., supra note 71, at 10.
87 Interview with Beatriz, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 19, 2014) (transcript on file
with author). Later, she returned to this theme, noting that “being undocumented is
emotionally traumatic because I could not go and bury my mother.” Id.
88 Interview with Oralia, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Jan. 8, 2015) (transcript on file with
author) (“A: Does your mother still live? O: She does, and that makes me want to
return. I don’t want the same thing to happen as with my dad. I didn’t see him, I
wasn’t there. It’s very sad, because he also didn’t want to die, and he fell in a coma and
my brother — it was like he was waiting, because when the call went through, my
brother put the phone on for him, and I said, ‘Dad it’s me, get up from there.’ It’s a
very hard thing. I said, ‘Forgive me dad, I love you very much.’ And then my dad died.
My brother took the phone away and my father smiled and my brother said, ‘Dad just
wanted to hear your voice’ And I said, yes, that’s it . . . . He died the 5th of January,
this 5th of January has been two years since he died. I still think why did I come to
this country? It has not left me anything. You come and you don’t know what’s going
to happen. You are so far. I think, why?”).
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to them for the last time, are very painful feelings.”89 This was a
recurring theme.90
Many mentioned hardships generated by their ongoing separation
from children or parents. Tomás was proud that he had supported his
children in Mexico when they were young since he made it possible
for them to go to school there. But he lamented never seeing them.91
Notwithstanding the many other social and economic hardships she
discussed with us, Oralia, whose children remained behind in
Guatemala said simply, “I would be the happiest woman in the world
if my children were here with me.”92
The desire for a legal status that would allow individuals to visit
children and grandchildren and to petition for them to come to the
United States was a frequently recurring theme. Beatriz, for example,
mentioned that she has a daughter and two grandchildren in Peru
whom she is unable to visit.93 She explained that if she had legal
residency, she would use it to “bring my daughter here so that my
grandchildren can have a better future here . . . .”94
b.

Impediments to Freedom of Movement

Another theme that dominated the discussion of hardships and
vulnerabilities was the restrictions that unauthorized status placed on
the respondents’ freedom of movement. Restrictions on freedom of
movement manifested in at least three distinct ways and were
frequently interrelated with family separation concerns. The first was
the impossibility of crossing international boundaries. Many
respondents suggested that one of the most troubling dimensions of
their unauthorized status was their inability to travel to their country
of origin to visit family members or dying loved ones.95
89 Interview with Alondra, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 19, 2014) (transcript on file
with author).
90 Even Patricio, a single man with an almost unbelievably optimistic philosophy
and persistent refusal to admit to hardships or vulnerabilities, thought that deferred
action or legalization would be helpful, “[b]ecause you could visit your family in
Mexico. That’s an opportunity you have when you have residency or when you have
papers.” Interview with Patricio, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Feb. 1, 2015) (transcript on file
with author).
91 Interview with Tomás, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Apr. 8, 2013) (transcript on file
with author). Tomás did have one son who was with him in the U.S. Id.
92 Interview with Oralia, supra note 88.
93 Interview with Beatriz, supra note 87.
94 Id.
95 Interview with Beatriz, supra note 87; Interview with Oralia, supra note 88.
Some respondents also expressed frustration with their inability to travel by air. See,
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A second commonly experienced limitation on mobility was that
imposed by respondents’ inability to obtain driver’s licenses and
insurance because of their legal status. Numerous respondents
provided anecdotes of fearful encounters with police or other drivers
when involved in accidents or other incidents on the road, with
several describing the police in Los Angeles as deliberately targeting
undocumented drivers in order to assess fines and fees.96 Alondra put
into words the experience that many of our respondents had — living
in fear that they would be profiled and stopped by the police and that
their cars would be impounded for lack of a license:
The immigrants have benefitted a lot from Governor Brown
because before, an immigrant who was driving and was
stopped due to a broken headlight, the police could stop them
and impound the car. The police got a lot of money from the
cars of immigrants. They know they can take them away. And
then these people have to go before a judge, they have to pay a
fine for driving without a license. For a normal person, it
should cost around $500 or $400. But for someone who
doesn’t have documents, it is $2,500. The jails are full, full of
undocumented people, who have to be there for 3 months
because the jails are a business. It is a private business.97
Alondra’s reference to Governor Brown refers to the fact that on
October 3, 2013, he signed into law California A.B. 60, which went
into effect in January 2015 and which allows qualifying unauthorized
migrant residents to obtain California driver’s licenses.98 Although we
had designed our questions prior to the passage of A.B. 60 and did not
ask about it directly, a number of immigrants we interviewed made
references to California A.B. 60, noting that it had changed their lives
for the better.99 The importance of A.B. 60 in the lives of unauthorized
e.g., Interview with Mauricio, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Jan. 25, 2015) (transcript on file
with author) (“When you travel, there is always a risk. I’d like to travel, to visit Alaska
and Colorado, but now I can’t.”).
96 See Interview with Alondra, supra note 89; Interview with Margarita, in Los
Angeles, Cal. (Dec. 15, 2014) (transcript on file with author); Interview with Coni, in
Los Angeles, Cal. (May 7, 2016) (transcript on file with author); Interview with Mario,
in Los Angeles, Cal., (May 9, 2016) (transcript on file with author).
97 Interview with Alondra, supra note 89; see also Interview with Fatima, in Los
Angeles, Cal. (Aug. 16, 2016) (transcript on file with author) (“[T]here are lots of
people that couldn’t get licenses and [the police] continue benefitting in that — in
taking cars away.”)
98 A.B. 60, 2013 State Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
99 See, e.g., Interview with Tomás, supra note 91; Interview with Dean, in Orange
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migrants provides further evidence — if more was needed — of the
significance of sub-federal immigration regulation in determining the
quality of life of immigrants in general and unauthorized immigrant
residents in particular.100
The legislature enacted other immigrant protective laws during this
time period as well.101 On January 2, 2014, The California TRUST Act
went into effect.102 The TRUST Act limits information sharing between
state and local police and federal immigration enforcement officials to
the extent permitted by federal law, and which outlines strict
limitations on when state, county, and local officials can comply with
ICE detainer requests. On July 21, 2014, Governor Brown signed a
revision to the California Penal Code limiting misdemeanor sentences
to 364 days, thereby avoiding triggering the numerous negative
consequences associated with an “aggravated felony” in immigration
law.103 Perhaps because of the nature of our sample population —
County, Cal. (Apr. 7, 2015) (transcript on file with author) (discussing his
undocumented father); Interview with Fatima, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Mar. 16, 2015)
(transcript on file with author).
100 For more on this theme see, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for
Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126,
1030-35 (2013); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
703, 705-06 (2013) (discussing state level integration measures); Angela S. García,
Pressure from the Inside: The Subnational Politics of Immigration, in RECESSION WITHOUT
BORDERS: MEXICAN MIGRANTS CONFRONT THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 43 (David S.
FitzGerald ed., 2011). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters:
Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1819 (2011) (discussing the important discretionary role of local law
enforcement in shaping immigration outcomes); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008)
(discussing integrationist efforts); Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration
Policymaking, 79 UMKC L. REV. 901 (2011) (reexamining the need for local
immigration policymaking in light of the changing nature of federal immigration law
and explaining the difficulties in adopting these policies).
101 For a description and analysis of recent immigrant-protective policies in
California, see generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice in an Era of Mass Deportation:
Reforms from California, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 12 (2017) (detailing California’s
adjustments to processes such as plea agreements). Since the election of Donald J.
Trump as president, the California legislature has enacted several more immigrantprotective laws, prompting a lawsuit by the federal government claiming that the
recent legislation exceeds the state’s constitutional power. Complaint at 2-3, U.S. v.
Sessions, No. 18-264 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018) (alleging that California’s A.B. 450,
limiting federal enforcement access to private workplaces, California’s A.B. 103,
imposing conditions on immigration detention facilities, and S.B. 54, limiting state
officials’ compliance with immigration enforcement actions, all exceed the state’s
constitutional authority).
102 TRUST Act, A.B. 4, 2013 State Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
103 S.B. 1310, 2013 State Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (codified as
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none of our respondents have had prolonged encounters with the
criminal justice system — these criminal justice-related laws did not
come up in our discussions, whereas A.B. 60 did. But this does not
mean that the reforms are insignificant.104 Unlike their clients and
constituents, the staff at immigrant-serving organizations, particularly
those who worked with detained client populations, mentioned these
criminal enforcement and misdemeanor sentencing reforms as
significant immigrant-protective developments.105
A third common limitation on mobility was the limitation imposed
by the respondent’s fear of being apprehended for immigration
violations in the ordinary course of the day. One Los Angeles-based
respondent lamented, for example, that she could not take her
children to SeaWorld because of the fixed border checkpoint in San
Clemente, California.106 Many others expressed concerns about their
fear of detection (or their fear of a family member’s detection) on the
way to work or in the course of daily life, although sub-federal
differences seemed to matter. Orange County respondents were more
likely than Los Angeles County respondents to express concerns that
police encounters could lead to deportation,107 which is consistent
CAL. PENAL CODE § 18.5). For a discussion of the full immigration consequences of
committing an “aggravated felony,” see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:
OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 227-28 (2007); Teresa Miller, Blurring the Boundaries
Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
81, 83-85 (2005); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the
Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99 (1998).
104 It is possible that these reforms were viewed as important, but the respondents
did not wish to dwell on past or potential contact that they or their loved ones may
have with the criminal justice system.
105 See, e.g., Interview with Josue, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Sept. 19, 2014) (transcript
on file with author); Interview with Julie, Staff Member at an Immigrant-Serving
Organization, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Sept. 19, 2014) (transcript on file with author).
106 Interview with Margarita, supra note 96.
107 For typical attitudes in Los Angeles, see Interview with Oralia, supra note 88
(“I: [On] the route that you take to do your errands, go to the market, to the clinic, do
you worry that at some point somebody is going to ask you for a document? O: No.”).
Oralia also discussed two incidents where her husband’s car was stolen and the police
helped them. But there were exceptions. Id. Margarita said that she avoided a certain
metro station out of fear of detection, for example. Interview with Margarita, supra
note 96. In contrast, many Orange County respondents expressed fears about
immigration enforcement as a part of their daily life. See, e.g., Interview with Mireya,
in Orange County, Cal. (Aug. 3, 2016) (transcript on file with author) (discussing fear
for her undocumented father whenever he visited her on her college campus in
Orange County); see also Interview with Raul, Orange County advocate (Nov. 22,
2016) (noting that because of the City of Santa Ana’s contract with, with ICE, “I don’t
know if folks are going to feel safe to, to be in Santa Ana, you know, you get picked up
by the police for a traffic violation and, um, you get taken into an ICE detention cell.”)
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with Orange County officials’ reputations as home to law enforcement
agencies more likely to engage in county-level immigration
enforcement efforts that those in Los Angeles. In Los Angeles,
immigrant residents also routinely expressed concern that they would
be stopped on the basis of race. Unlike Orange County residents,
however, they were less concerned that this would lead to deportation,
and more concerned that the stops would result in license checks,
fines, fees, and auto impoundment.108 Within counties, immigrant
residents identified areas in which they felt more and less safe.109 And
respondents of various nationalities expressed the sentiment that
immigrants from Latin America who fit into stereotypical depictions of
undocumented Mexicans were more likely to be racially profiled than
were respondents from Asian countries.110
c.

Impediments to Work and Education

Unsurprisingly, individuals who lack legal authorization to work
face many challenges in the workplace.111 These challenges take
The contract that Raul referenced here ended a year later due to advocacy efforts.
108 See, e.g., Interview with Coni, supra note 96; Interview with Fatima, in Los
Angeles, Cal. (Dec. 6, 2014) (transcript on file with the author); Interview with
Alondra, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 19, 2014) (transcript on file with the author);
Interview with Herminia, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Dec. 9, 2014) (transcript on file with
the author).
109 See, e.g., Interview with Samuel, in Orange County, Cal. (May 7, 2015) (“I
think Anaheim is worst than Santa Ana . . . [b]ecause [there] . . . you get stopped by
the cops and they have immigration . . . at the jails [and one] can get deported at that
time . . . right away, . . . when you don’t know your rights.”); see also Interview with
Mireya, in Orange County, Cal. (May 19, 2015) (discussing feeling safer on campus
than in other parts of the city and county).
110 See, e.g., Interview with Ms. Choi, in Orange County, Cal. (Nov. 11, 2017) (“I
guess even though we are all undocumented, Mexicans have more disadvantage
sometimes. For example, if we get stopped by the police, they’re more likely to get
detained than us [Korean immigrants.]”); see also infra notes 148–49.
111 Median household income of unauthorized immigrants was $36,000 in 2007,
compared to $50,000 for their U.S.-resident counterparts. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al., A
Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, PEW HISP. CTR. 4 (2009),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf [http://perma.cc/RG82-2XBA]. But
lower wages are not the only disadvantages that unauthorized migrants experience in
the workplace. For additional discussion see, e.g., MARY BAUER & MÓNICA RAMÍREZ,
INJUSTICE ON OUR PLATES: IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE U.S. FOOD INDUSTRY 45-48 (Booth
Gunter ed., 2010); SHANNON GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE
OF WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2016); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN
SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005); Eunice Hyunhye Cho et al., A
New Understanding of Substantial Abuse: Evaluating Harm in U Visa Petitions for
Immigrant Victims of Workplace Crimes, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 23 (2014); Kati Griffith
& Shannon Gleeson, The Precarity of Temporality: How Law Inhibits Immigrant Worker
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different forms. Many of our respondents talked about their inability
to secure work commensurate with experience. Herminia, who had
almost completed a college degree in biology, said, “It makes me sad
that I went to school so many years, and, if I can find a job cleaning,
I’ll be lucky.”112 Others described abusive workplace conditions.113
Several respondents also noted that they had experienced situations
where they were underpaid or not paid at all for work that they had
completed. Erasmo told us that “there are companies that employ you
and won’t pay vacation time, and holidays are also unpaid, and so
there are many disparities when compared to people who work and
who are documented. That speaks to some of the ways in which they
abuse us. That’s what we know about, but you also see it in your
wages.”114 In his experience, unauthorized workers were visibly
treated worse than other workers and, less visibly, compensated at less
favorable rates.
Tomás, a day laborer who worked as a painter, said that there were
many times when an employer would refuse outright to pay him and
other unauthorized workers for completed work.115 He stressed that
some employers were good and some were bad in this regard. One
community organizer who was himself an immigrant argued, “[W]e
Claims, 39 COMP. LAB. L. & POL. J. 111, 123 (2017); Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of
Color-Blindness: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the Failure of
Immigration Reform, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 313, 352 (2012); Stephen Lee, Policing Wage
Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 655, 656 (2014); Maria L.
Ontiveros, Lessons from the Fields: Female Farmworkers and the Law, 55 ME. L. REV.
157, 162 (2003); Amanda Clark, Note, A Hometown Dilemma: Addressing the Sexual
Harassment of Undocumented Women in Meatpacking Plants in Iowa and Nebraska, 16
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 139, 143-44 (2004).
112 Interview with Herminia, supra note 108; see also Interview with Dean, supra
note 99 (discussing the low wage and “shady” jobs available to his college-educated
sister prior to DACA). Our findings that unauthorized immigrants generally do not
find work and pay commensurate with their education and work experience are
consistent with Gonzalez & Terriquez, supra note 71, at 1-2; Patler & Cabrera, supra
note 71, at 4; Wong & Valdivia supra note 71 (finding that DACA recipients were
better able to secure jobs and higher wages than they were before they were DACAmented).
113 See, e.g., Interview with Michaela, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Aug. 27, 2016)
(“[T]hey can take advantage of us at work. For instance, we are not paid overtime
when we work extra hours. And we have to withstand (aguantar) moral abuses, and
verbal, and physical abuses at work, like when the owner yells at us in his language,
which is Korean and I can’t understand it, but I don’t like being yelled at.”).
114 Interview with Erasmo, Undocumented Immigrant, in Santa Monica, Cal. (Dec.
6, 2014) (transcript on file with author).
115 Interview with Tomás, supra note 91; see also Interview with Oralia, supra note
88 (discussing the lower wages received by employees without papers).
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need the right to work. We deal with it every day. You are working
under low salaries, exploitation, bad working conditions. You have to
deal with it every day.”116 Wage theft and workplace exploitation are
well-documented phenomena among workers who lack legal
authorization to work.117
d.

Fear of Deportation

Respondents lived in fear of deportation.118 This fear is interrelated
with, and reifies, many of their other vulnerabilities. It affects their
sense of family security because many live with the constant
background fear of their own possible deportation, the deportation of
a loved one or both.119 This fear prevents parents from speaking with
school officials when they have concerns about their children.120 This
fear limits mobility, preventing unauthorized migrants from traveling
freely.121 It stops people from seeking redress when they suffer harms
in the workplace.122 Simply put, this fear affects all aspects of life. As
116 Interview with Yupanqui, Organizer, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Oct. 2, 2014)
(transcript on file with author). Some respondents framed the issue not as a lack of
rights, but as a lack of knowledge of rights. For example, Alondra tells this story about
someone she encountered at an event sponsored by one organization: “They can break
their leg. They don’t have anyone to support them. The other day, there was someone
working moving furniture, who broke a tooth. And they don’t even ask for the person
who hired them to help them. No, they just leave. Because the day laborers know that
if they are doing this work, they are exposed to this, and that no one will pay them.
They do not know their rights. They don’t demand [them].” Interview with Alondra,
supra note 89.
117 See, e.g., Llezlie Green Coleman, Procedural Hurdles and Thwarted Efficiency:
Immigration Relief in Wage and Hour Collective Action, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 7
(2013) (finding that undocumented immigrant workers are the victims of the most
severe wage theft). See generally Griffith & Gleeson, supra note 111 (analyzing the
shortcomings of workplace protection laws in protecting undocumented workers).
118 These findings accord with other studies of unauthorized immigrants. See, e.g.,
JOANNA DREBY, EVERYDAY ILLEGAL: WHEN POLICIES UNDERMINE IMMIGRANT FAMILIES 2021 (2015); Abrego & Menjívar, supra note 86, at 15; Menjívar, supra note 52, at 1023.
DACA does not eliminate this worry.
119 Interview with Beatriz, supra note 87 (“[T]here’s also a fear. I know my son but
I don’t know the people that are on the streets. He bought his bicycle but I’m afraid
when I see the police or the firefighters. When he’s in the house, I don’t worry.”); see
also DREBY, supra note 118, at 22.
120 Interview with Cora, Los Angeles organizer (Sept. 3, 2014) (transcript on file
with author).
121 See discussion supra section I.B.1.b.
122 See, e.g., Interview with Oralia, supra note 88 (discussing her inability to gain
full redress when her employer’s pit bull attacked her while she was cleaning); see also
Interview with Tomás, supra note 91 (describing instances of wage theft).
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Beatriz put it, “We’re a bit traumatized. Maybe the police show up
unannounced. It’s just the fear. And that’s part of being [without
formal legal status]. It’s a fear. You have to be on the lookout towards
everything and everyone.”123 Beatriz expressed her fears in 2014,
making clear that the fear was palpable and significant long before
President Trump assumed office.
Respondents identified lawful status as a means to “free” them from
this crippling fear. Patricio, for example, explained, “I support . . . that
everyone can obtain the residency or something like that. That will
give us the opportunity so that we can be free. Many people live in fear
in the United States, because of paper or residency status. To have the
residency means to live freely. They have the opportunity to live free,
to feel liberated from something[.]”124
e.

Harm to Social Standing

Harms to social standing125 described by immigrant residents took
many forms, including a feeling of being disrespected by other
community members in casual encounters,126 a feeling of being treated
as lesser by police, judges and other public officials,127 a perceived lack
123 Interview with Beatriz, supra note 87. Beatriz uses the Spanish term informal to
describe her status. Id. On the trauma associated with unauthorized status, see, e.g.,
Cárola Suarez-Orozco et al., Growing Up in the Shadows: The Developmental
Implications of Unauthorized Status, 81 HARV. EDUC. REV. 459, 461-62 (2011).
124 Interview with Patricio, supra note 90 (emphasis added). Patricio explained that
even though he was not DAPA eligible — he had no children — he supported the
reform for others. Id.
125 In this paper, we follow Judith Shklar in focusing on social “standing” rather
than “status.” SHKLAR, supra note 1. We do so not only to avoid what Shklar describes
as the negative connotations of “status,” see SHKLAR at 2; but also to distinguish social
standing from legal status, as these are two separate and central concerns in our
project.
126 Interview with Oralia, supra note 88 (“Here, there are people who humiliate
you, who yell at you, who treat you very lowly. When my kid was little, I would get
on the buses and he couldn’t speak, he would just yell. They threw me off the bus two
times . . . I couldn’t find the ways by which to explain to the driver, she was black, I
told her, you are not going to kick me off because he’s a little kid and he can’t speak.
No. She started yelling at me and a friend told me, ‘let’s get down.’”); see also Mireya,
supra note 109 (discussing an encounter where she and her mother were disrespected
at an Orange County restaurant).
127 See, e.g., Interview with Tomás, supra note 91 (“The police profile you on the
basis of your color. If they see that you are guerro, a gabacho, they leave you alone. All
of the enforcement of the law they use against Latinos. And they don’t help people
who don’t have documents.”); see also Interview with Fatima, supra note 99
(describing an encounter with the Los Angeles police which she experienced as
discriminatory). For a more detailed analysis of Fatima’s interaction, see Jennifer M.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3627797

Citizenship Matters

2018]

37

of social acceptance,128 and an inability to find work commensurate
with experience.129 As we discuss further below, the harms that
respondents attributed to immigration status were interrelated in
complex ways with discrimination they experienced on account of
race, national origin, and limited English proficiency.
2.

Mapping Vulnerabilities onto Immigration Law

What do noncitizens need to mitigate these vulnerabilities? Many
respondents focused on a permanent grant of legal status as a solution
to their problems. A typical example was Oralia. When asked near the
end of her interview if she wanted to be a citizen, she replied:
O: Wow! Well, I would be satisfied even with being a resident.
A: Why?
O: If I were a resident I could go back to my country, and I
could visit my family. If there’s an emergency, I could get on a
flight and go. I could get a better job. I could — there are more
advantages for those that have papers than for those that don’t.
So I don’t ask for much, I just ask to be a resident. Even
though, citizens when they retire they have a lot of benefits,
because trabajan sus papeles130 [they work their papers]. But in
Chacon & Susan Bibler Coutin, Racialization Through Enforcement in RACE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION CONTROL (Mary Bosworth, Alpa Parmer & Yolanda Vazquez
eds., 2018).
128 Interview with Dean, supra note 99 (“T]his is where I call home, and for people
not to say, ‘this is not your home; you’re just a foreigner.’ That’s very detrimental . . .
Since DACA is temporary, I still have to reapply, pay money, still live in fear of not
being granted status. So if I am a U.S. citizen, I no longer have to live in fear and the
same goes for my family. I don’t have to be in fear for them and they don’t have to be
in fear for themselves.”).
129 See, e.g., Interview with Oralia, supra note 88; Mireya, supra note 109; Alondra,
supra note 108 (discussing being demeaned in public).
130 We could translate this as “their documents work” or, more loosely, they work
using their papers. The “papers” of citizens and authorized workers allow for the
accumulation of earned benefits. See, e.g., Interview with Oralia, supra note 88. In this
vein, one of our research team members has heard at least one DACA recipient
seeking renewal ask if it would be a problem for renewal “that I haven’t worked my
social,” meaning that they had not been employed even though they had a social
security number.
Oralia’s phrasing also recalls another way that citizens “work their documents,” by
sharing them with unauthorized workers for financial gain in the informal economy,
although there is no suggestion in our interviews of any such exchanges. On this
possible meaning, see Sarah Horton, Identity Loan: The Moral Economy of Migrant
Document Exchange in California’s Central Valley, 42 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 1, 55 (2015).
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the cases that one doesn’t have them, they comfort themselves
with a little bit.131
The evidence that we gathered through these interviews might
suggest that for many respondents, and particularly older respondents,
there is either a relative indifference between citizenship and a lesser
form of lawful residence, or perhaps more precisely, as in the case of
Oralia, an outright recognition that citizenship is better, but that they
would be content with less.132 Several respondents suggested that
citizenship is important for obtaining government benefits
(particularly health benefits and social security), but that they view
such benefits as a privilege they would be willing to live without.133
Does this mean that organizations that work with and on behalf of
immigrants should back an immigration reform package that would
stop short of full citizenship for long-time unauthorized residents?
And if so, what sort of legal status will suffice to mitigate the worst
harms generated by a lack of legal status?
The answer to that question is complex. At one level, noncitizens
would benefit from any compromise that addresses their sources of
legal and social vulnerabilities. Almost any such a compromise could
improve the current situation of some of our respondents. But when
the particular vulnerabilities that noncitizens focus upon in the
accounts of their lives are mapped against the rights afforded by legal
immigration statuses and citizenship, the resulting picture reveals
deep vulnerability in any lawful status short of citizenship (and also
highlights some of the problems of contemporary citizenship). This
does not mean that a political compromise resulting in immigration
reform without citizenship would never be desirable — it is certainly
an improvement over the status quo. But it does suggest that the price
of such compromise may be higher than is generally acknowledged.
The extent to which incomplete inclusion will improve the lives of
currently unauthorized immigrant residents will turn on how robust
their legal protections are (both formally and on the ground) and how
131

Interview with Oralia, supra note 88.
See infra section III.
133 See, e.g., Interview with Oralia, supra note 88. Note that the relative youth of
our respondents might be driving this response. Two respondents — both older —
talked about health problems and their difficulty in accessing paying for health
services. As the unauthorized population ages, health benefits and other forms of
social support will inevitably become more important to them. See, e.g., id; Interview
with Alondra, supra note 89. But the rising tide of citizenship worthiness discourse
likely encourages a self-imposed politics of rugged individualism and rejection of
perceived dependence on government programs. See discussion infra at Part II.A.
132
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ongoing immigration enforcement efforts and other law enforcement
measures jeopardize the stability of that status. Most policy
discussions fail to take into account the interrelated and dynamic
nature of legal immigration status and law enforcement initiatives.
Additionally, the very malleability of lawful status creates long-term
risks for a population that would be systematically denied access to
the federal ballot box because they lack citizenship. Simply put, in the
U.S. legal system, legal status can be revised, and legal protections for
“aliens” can be lost as a consequence of executive branch changes to
regulations and Congressional changes to legislation. All of this has
happened before.134 And the discrimination that immigrants
experience as a result of perceived status could undercut the benefits
of any incomplete form of legal inclusion. This section explores how
temporary relief from removal, and even more permanent forms of
lawful immigration status, fall short as a remedy for many of the
harms and vulnerabilities identified in our conversations with
unauthorized migrants.
a.

What Lawful Status Can and Cannot Do

Research on DACA recipients has shown that the lawful presence
bestowed by DACA only imperfectly alleviated the legal impediments
that unauthorized respondents experience with regard to family unity,
free mobility, access to work and freedom from fear of deportation.
Those gaps in protection, which also exist for other individuals with
temporary lawful status such as TPS, are discussed below. It is often
assumed that more permanent and complete legal status — one more
akin to LPR status — would fill in the most critical remaining gaps of
protection. Indeed, many advocates of legalization without citizenship
policies assume that such legalization will address the core concerns of
unauthorized migrants seeking legal status. It is certainly true that a
permanent resident status would be more protective than DACA or
TPS, and would leave immigrant residents feeling more secure in their
status. But to a notable degree, lawful permanent residence would fail
in important ways to alleviate immigrants’ vulnerabilities. This section
illustrates the shortcomings of lawful permanent residency without
access to citizenship as an incorporative status.

134 This statement could be attributed to anyone from J.M. Barrie to the 2004
Battlestar Galactica series. For an account of the stripping down of LPR protections in
recent history, see HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (2006).
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Immigration law scholars have tended to favor access to citizenship
as the appropriate means of regularizing the status of long-term
immigrant residents. They often allude to the marginalization and
exploitation of immigrants that accompanied previous immigration
policies that offered residency without citizenship.135 Established
immigrants’ rights organizations136 also have argued that legalization
without citizenship will create a permanent caste of disenfranchised,
second-class residents.137 For many of these scholars and activists, any
turn to legalization methods that preclude or decrease support for
citizenship are suspect.
But some supporters of legalization without citizenship believe that
advocates are confusing their own policy preferences with those of
unauthorized migrants. They argue that immigrants support — or at
least would support — a policy of legalization even if it does not
include citizenship.138 And in the absence of legislative reform, even
the staunchest advocates of a path to citizenship for unauthorized
residents have often determined that anything is better than nothing.
Thus, immigrant justice organizations around the country came to
support, advocate for, and provide legal services to promote access to
President Obama’s DACA program, notwithstanding the fact that it did
135 See generally Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a
Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 9 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219
(2007) (discussing the inadequacies of a large-scale guest worker program).
136 Organizations like the National Immigrant Law Center, the Immigrant Legal
Resource Center, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Public
Counsel, the American Civil Liberties Union and others have long supported
comprehensive immigration reform with a path to citizenship.
137 Significantly, some immigrants’ justice groups are no longer advocating primarily for
a path to citizenship and are instead focusing on law reform that would achieve greater
dignity for all immigrants, regardless of citizenship. United We Dream, for example,
advocates protection from deportation for all immigrants with their “Here to Stay”
campaign. See About #HereToStay, HERE TO STAY, http://weareheretostay.org/about-thehere-to-stay-network/ (last visited Jul. 7, 2018). Activists are also organizing with calls for
“Not One More” deportation. See About, #NOT1MORE, http://www.notonemoredeportation.
com/about/ (last visited Jul. 7, 2018).
138 Skerry, supra note 37. Others do not even purport to consider what unauthorized
migrants want out of law reform, simply arguing instead that, while legalization is a
sensible policy outcome, unauthorized migrants do not deserve citizenship because they
broke the law. See Ross K. Baker, Legalization, Yes. Citizenship, No: Column, USA TODAY
(June 10, 2013 6:18 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/10/ross-bakeron-legalization-not-citizenship/2409939/ (arguing that citizenship should not be available
for “people who did not play by the rules”); BUSH & BOLICK, supra note 37 at 43-44
(arguing that citizenship should be off the table for individuals “who entered the country
illegally as adults” because to grant citizenship undermines the “integrity” of the
immigration system and the notion that “actions have consequences”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3627797

2018]

Citizenship Matters

41

not offer citizenship nor legal status, just temporary prosecutorial
restraint and work authorization.
Notably, however, in an era in which noncitizens have been active
proponents of immigration and labor reform in the political sphere,
and in which their voices have played a critical role in contesting the
appropriate framing of reform efforts,139 few scholars have
incorporated those voices into their analyses of the policy design
questions currently at the heart of immigration reform.140
Understanding what the purported beneficiaries of immigration
reform actually want and need from that reform requires more than
simply asking noncitizens whether they would be satisfied by a law
that offers them something less than citizenship. Almost all certainly
would (and do) because it would improve their material conditions.
But mapping the formal legal benefits and protections actually offered
by various proposed legal statuses against what immigrants say they
hope to gain through immigration law reform reveals important gaps
in “legalization without citizenship” plans, even as the resulting
insights highlight the pitfalls of the weaker liminal statuses that
involve neither legalization nor citizenship.
To be clear, the point here is not that half-measures are
unacceptable political compromises. Many immigrants would benefit
(and have benefitted) from such half-measures and would support
them. The point is that the costs of half-measures are both higher and
more diffuse than their proponents suggest.

139 For a discussion of the critical political role played by young undocumented
residents in shaping the terms of the debate, see, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Performative
Citizenship in the Civil Rights and Immigrant Rights Movements, in A NATION OF
WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50, at 9 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R.
Bagenstos eds., 2015); Leisy Abrego, Legitimacy, Social Identity, and the Mobilization of
Law: The Effects of Assembly Bill 540 on Undocumented Students in California, 33 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 709, 714-15 (2008); Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92
N.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013); see also Elizabeth Keyes, Race and Immigration, Then and
Now: How the Shift to “Worthiness” Undermines the 1965 Immigration Law’s Civil Rights
Goals, 57 HOW. L.J. 899, 920 (2014).
140 Emily Ryo is a notable exception. See generally Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement,
More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622 (2015)
(relying on interviews with unauthorized migrants to assess how they understand and
characterize their noncompliance with U.S. immigration law). And, of course, many
immigration scholars draw on their work with noncitizen clients or on the fieldwork
of other scholars to inform their research.
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Family and Free Movement

DACA recipients and other recipients of deferred action status could
travel much more freely within the United States than undocumented
migrants, and even travel internationally at times. But serious
limitations on family unification and related travel persisted. DACA
recipients had to request advanced parole to leave the country and
remained vulnerable to being excluded even if they had it.141 They
were frequently discouraged from traveling internationally since
parole (like DACA itself) could be revoked at the pleasure of the
executive branch.142 Because they themselves lack legal status, DACA
recipients could not petition on behalf of family members who might
want to enter the United States.143 Moreover fear of family separation
persisted since most DACA recipients have close family members who
were out of status and not covered by deferred action programs.144
Domestically, DACA recipients were able to move more freely —
particularly in states in which they would have been unable to access
driver’s licenses without DACA145 — but they were also aware that
141 I-131, Application for Travel Document, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/i-131 (last
visited Jul. 8, 2018); see Prerna Lal, Trip Tips: Traveling with Advance Parole Through
DACA, UNDOCUMENTED STUDENT PROGRAM UC BERKELEY, http://undocu.berkeley.edu/
faq/travelling-with-advance-parole-daca/ (last visited Jul. 7, 2018) (describing the
process for traveling with advanced parole with DACA).
142 Even during the height of DACA protections, one of our respondent
organizations told a member of our research team that they advise DACA recipients to
be wary of applying for advanced parole. Even though advanced parole could be seen
as legally advantageous because it allows people to gain “admission” upon return to
the country as parolees, thus ultimately making them eligible for adjustment of status
in cases where they are the beneficiaries of a visa petition filed by a qualified family
member, that benefit may well be outweighed by the possibility that they can be
denied reentry even with advanced parole. The legal uncertainty over the entire DACA
program generated by the DAPA litigation and the 2016 election results only
aggravates the legal tenuousness of advanced parole. In short, advanced parole is a
“license” to reenter that can be denied at the time of attempted reentry in much the
same way that Chae Chan Ping and other long-term residents of the U.S. were denied
reentry upon passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act. See Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889).
143 Such petitions are limited to lawful permanent residents and citizens. See
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018).
144 Interview with Julie, supra note 105; Interview with Karina, in Orange County,
Cal. (Aug. 1, 2016) (discussing her concern for family members without status); see
also Joanna Dreby, The Burden of Deportation on Children of Mexican Immigrant
Families, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 829, 829 (2012).
145 Many states refuse driver’s licenses to unauthorized migrants. Even after the
announcement of DACA, Arizona and Nevada expressed their intention to deny
licenses to DACA recipients, but after litigation, all states now provide driver’s licenses
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driving raises the likelihood of contact with the police, and that any
such contact posed an immediate threat to their tenuous reprieve.146
Several respondents hypothesized that Latinos were vulnerable to
profiling that increased the likelihood of such interactions.147 One
respondent indicated that, as a Chinese woman, she did not fear that
she would be profiled, but she did not view her experience as
representative of the experience of all immigrants.148 Furthermore,
because driver’s licenses in most states clearly indicate the bearer’s
tenuous legal status,149 law enforcement officials interested in
prioritizing immigration enforcement goals could still readily identify
DACA recipients as foreign nationals.
Even before the attempted rescission of the program, the
immigration enforcement efforts of the Trump administration
highlighted the fragility of DACA. DACA protections proved
somewhat “sticky” in ways that its supporters hoped it would —
President Trump promised throughout his campaign that he would
“immediately terminate” the program, but took months to attempt to
end it, and even then, his Department of Homeland Security
announced a planned phase-out over six months.150 Federal district
to DACA recipients. See NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., Access to Driver’s Licenses for Immigrant
Youth Granted DACA (May 31, 2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
11/Access-to-DLs-for-immigrant-youth-with-DACA-2015-05-31.pdf.
146 Interview with Reese, in Orange County, Cal. (Feb. 24, 2015) (transcript on file
with author) (“I actually don’t drive when I’m here . . . I only drive when I’m back at
home [in Los Angeles County] and then . . . I guess I do kind of worry about getting
pulled over sometimes, so I just try to drive like a normal person or drive really
carefully . . . .”); Interview with Mireya, supra note 107; Interview with Ms. Park, in
Orange County, Cal. (transcript on file with author) (“[D]eportation is linked to
encountering police. I’m always self-conscious of what I do. A police can stop me and
accuse me of something, then ask for my license, which might lead the officer to
discover of my undocumented status.”).
147 Interview with Alondra, supra note 89; Interview with Erasmo, supra note 114;
Interview with Mario, supra note 96; Interview with Tomás, supra note 91.
148 Interview with Reese, supra note 146 (“I don’t fear racial profiling. Yeah, that’s
not something I have to worry about.”); see also Interview with Ms. Choi, supra note
110 (noting that Mexicans are at greater risk for racial profiling in the immigration
context).
149 States have developed these distinctions in their licenses order to comply with
the federal REAL ID law, which creates certain requirements for driver’s licenses that
will be used as a federal identification document. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REAL ID
FREQUENCY ASKED QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/real-idpublic-faqs.
150 Priscilla Alvarez, Trump’s Quiet Reversal on Deporting Young Undocumented
Immigrants, ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/04/trumps-quiet-reversal-on-deporting-young-undocumented-immigrants/524367/
(noting Trump’s failure to enact his promised DACA rescission in the early months of his
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courts then enjoined the phase-out, leaving the program on a grim life
support system, and allowing for renewals.151 Individuals filed for and
received renewals from USCIS during Trump’s first two years in office,
although some did encounter some difficulties.152
But any illusions that DACA is a truly secure status were shattered
even before the rescission. Several DACA recipients were arrested in
the months leading up to the program’s announced end. Daniel
Ramirez Medina was arrested during ICE’s execution of an arrest
warrant for his father, and ICE attempted to justify this seizure with
unsubstantiated claims that Ramirez is a gang member.153 Josue
Romero was arrested in San Antonio, Texas because he allegedly
possessed a small amount of marijuana.154 Daniela Vargas was arrested
after giving a speech protesting the ICE detention of her father and
brother.155 Her DACA status had lapsed because she had been unable
to pay the renewal.156 Because she has an outstanding deportation
presidency); Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and
Calls on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
09/05/us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers-immigration.html (discussing the planned phaseout of DACA announced on September 5, 2017).
151 NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 473 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting
government request to vacate prior order staying DACA rescission). Even Judge
Hanen, who famously enjoined the DAPA program and raised questions about the
constitutionality of DACA, declined the request of 10 states to enjoin the ongoing
DACA program. Texas v. United States, No. 1:18-CV-00068, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
149373, at *180-83 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018).
152 See Dara Lind, New Statistics Show the Government Is Sitting on Tens of Thousands
of DACA Applications, VOX (Mar. 1, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2018/3/1/17066606/daca-apply-statistics-backlog (reporting that “[t]he
administration has sent out tens of thousands of new two-year work permits to DACA
recipients who applied for renewals, either before the September 5 announcement or
before October 5,” but also observing that new applicants were not receiving timely
grants).
153 See Lawyer for Detained “Dreamer” Says ICE Documents Were Doctored, CBS
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2017, 7:16 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lawyer-for-detaineddreamer-daniel-ramirez-medina-says-ice-documents-were-doctored/.
154 See Bill Barajas, San Antonio DACA Student Detained by ICE Agents, ABC KSAT
12 (Feb.16, 2017, 10:04 PM), https://www.ksat.com/news/san-antonio-daca-studentdetained-by-ice-agents.
155 DREAMer Arrested in Miss. After Speaking About Immigration Issues, CBS NEWS
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dreamer-arrested-after-speakingabout-immigration-issues/.
156 Jennie Jarvey, Mississippi ‘Dreamer’ Daniela Vargas Released from Detention but
Deportation Order Stands, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017, 2:55 PM), http://www.latimes.
com/nation/la-na-mississippi-dreamer-20170310-story.html (although her DACA
status expired in November 2016 while she says she was trying to save up the $495
needed to renew it, her attorneys filed a renewal application in February). On the
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order, she can be removed administratively, without a hearing before
an immigration judge, although ICE, under public pressure, has
allowed her to remain in the country pending the outcome of her
claims for immigration relief.157 Despite the fact that the Trump
administration initially abandoned Trump’s campaign promise to end
the DACA program on day one, the spate of arrests early in the Trump
term sent a powerful reminder that DACA offered no ironclad
protection from arrest or even removal. The fragility of DACA’s
purported protections was on full display well before the program
phase-out was announced. That fragility is only more obvious now.
Legislative immigration reform packages generally hold out
something more substantive than a mere assurance that individuals are
not targets for deportation, and legislation that offered legal status
would theoretically be more protective than DACA. If it were akin to
contemporary LPR status, a more robust lawful resident status would
carry with it both the ability to travel abroad (enabling residents to see
family members outside the county) and the ability to petition for
immigration benefits on behalf of noncitizen family members.158
Notably, however, lawful permanent residents from Mexico and the
Philippines would still face continued barriers to reunification due to
extraordinary wait times generated by per-country caps on immigrant
visas.159 Indeed, to the extent reform proposals trade off family
immigration for purportedly “merit-based” systems,160 wait times are
problem of the pay-to-stay structure of DACA, see generally Chacón, supra note 10, at
727, 746-48.
157 Jarvey, supra note 156 (“The deportation order against her has not been
rescinded, however, and she is required to check in with her local ICE office in April,
her attorneys said. ‘One of the worries is they could enforce it at any point,’ Peterson
said, noting that the decision to release her seemed to be the result of prosecutorial
discretion, based largely on community pressure and media attention.”).
158 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 49, at 257.
159 Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits of Loving,
2007 WIS. L. REV 345, 359-60 (discussing the racial impacts of “neutral” per-country caps);
see Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2018) (describing limits on
immigrant visas and special provisions for immigrants from Mexico and the Philippines);
DEP’T OF STATE, Visa Bulletin for September 2018 (2018), https://travel.state.gov/
content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bulletin/2018/visa-bulletin-for-september-2018.html
(applying per-country caps on immigrant visas to “oversubscribed chargeability areas,”
including Mexico and the Philippines).
160 The Senate’s 2013 immigration reform bill contained some of these
compromises, and Donald Trump signaled in his March 1, 2017 State of the Union
address that he favored this approach. The recently introduced RAISE Act and the
Perdue-Cotton legislation also promote this approach. In truth, family-based
immigration, which “promotes the stability, health and productivity of family
members,” has long complemented employment-based immigration as a source of
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likely to lengthen for some families, even as whole family reunification
categories may be eliminated. It also unclear whether individuals
granted permanent resident status pursuant to an immigration reform
package would be granted the broad ability to petition for relatives
that current LPRs have.161 Some proponents of legalization-withoutcitizenship proposals might see such proposals as a vehicle to
minimize related family unification migration.162
Lawful status without citizenship would also continue to limit the
mobility of its recipients. While a recognized legal status would reduce
barriers to domestic, local and international mobility, the mobility
benefits that lawful status bestows are surprisingly fragile and
contingent. Currently, LPRs generally can travel freely across national
borders, and only individuals who leave the country for periods of
time in excess of a year risk losing their LPR status.163 But those travel
benefits remain a privilege, not a right, under the law. The fragility of
this privilege was recently highlighted when Trump enacted a travel
ban that purported to bar all travelers from seven countries from
economic strength, even if its contribution is seldom recognized as such. See, e.g.,
Role of Family-Based Immigration in the U.S. Immigration System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and International Law
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 23, 24 (2007) (statement and prepared
remarks of Bill Ong Hing, Professor, UC Davis) [hereinafter Hing Statement]. It is not
certain that a restrictive merit-based system would actually help the economy. See,
e.g., Priscilla Alvarez, Is a Merit-Based Immigration System a Good Idea?, THE ATLANTIC,
(Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/trump-cottonperdue-merit-based-immigration-system/518985/ (highlighting arguments of the
possible negative economic consequences of the “merit-based” system).
161 See, e.g., James Pethokoukis, Legalization Without Citizenship Wouldn’t Be
Amnesty — and Might Jump Start Immigration Reform, AEIDEAS (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.aei.org/publication/legalization-without-citizenship-wouldnt-be-amnestyand-might-jump-start-immigration-reform/ (noting that the rights of individuals
granted legal status under such plans would be negotiable).
162 “Chain migration” is a term used by academics to explain how migrants rely on
social networks to structure their migration decisions and processes, but the term has
recently been politicized, with restrictionists deploying the term in ways that suggest
the concept is unsavory and dangerous. For a discussion of the concept and its
politicization, see, e.g., Arissa H. Oh & Ellen Wu, Why Immigration Advocates Must
Take Back the Term ‘Chain Migration,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/02/01/why-immigration-advocatesmust-take-back-the-term-chain-migration/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bf8706d5b209;
Linda Qiu, ‘Chain Migration’ Has Become a Weaponized Phrase. Here are the Facts Behind It.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/us/politics/the-factsbehind-the-weaponized-phrase-chain-migration.html. For a response to earlier attacks on
“chain migration,” see Hing Statement, supra note 160.
163 See 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(a)(2) (2018) (creating rebuttable presumption of
abandonment of LPR status after absences of more than a year).
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entering the U.S. The ban was applied not just to incoming nonimmigrant visa holders, but to LPRs. And although the ban on LPRs
was reversed in the early days of the ban, first through DHS waivers
and then through a general DHS policy exempting LPRs, the early
tumultuous days of the ban illustrated that foreign nationals of every
status remain vulnerable in the immigration system. LPRs who spend
a short time abroad are entitled to greater process than other intending
immigrants, but they can still be excluded through administrative
proceedings, and the constitutional case law suggests that they can be
excluded administratively (and even on secret evidence) after periods
of prolonged absence.164
Thus, even if individuals were granted a robust legal status akin to
LPR status, their ability to travel freely would remain a privilege, not a
right. Moreover, individuals granted legalization-without-citizenship
could be subject to more stringent conditions and restrictions on
travel than current LPRs. At present, there is no evident constitutional
guarantee of any baseline international travel freedom for individuals
with legal status in the U.S. In short, lawful status almost certainly
would allow more transnational travel, including to see family
members. But there would be no guarantee of family reunification in
the U.S., and restrictions on travel outside of the U.S. could be
imposed at any time. Legal status without citizenship thus falls far
short of the protections of citizenship, which include the ability to
petition for reunification with a defined class of qualified family
members in the U.S. and to travel (and stay away as long as desired)
without losing the right to return to the U.S.
ii.

Work and Education

Respondents who assume that legal status would improve their
employment situation are right.165 DACA recipients, even with their
very thin form of temporarily tolerated presence and resulting work
authorization, appear to have had greater access to better working
conditions and work commensurate with experience.166 With
documents that allowed them to work legally, they had been given
access to a much wider range of job opportunities, and because they

164 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 226-27 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
165 See, e.g., Interview with Oralia, supra note 88 (“Not having papers is very
damaging. In the first place, we can’t find a good job, because if you have papers you
get a job that is OK, but if not, nothing.”).
166 See, e.g., Wong & Valdivia, supra note 71, at 3.
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no longer had to work off the books, they were less vulnerable to wage
theft and more likely to be paid competitive wages. As one of our
respondents put it in describing his sister’s post-DACA experience:
And post-DACA it helped a lot because my sister was able to
now work towards her area — her major. And so — and she
can now apply to jobs she wanted instead of . . . taking jobs
that even though she didn’t want to she had to, and same goes
for me I guess. I was able to work at a place where I wanted to
and I was able to actually choose where I wanted to work
instead of the other way around where they basically choose
me and say “You do whatever we want you to do and we’ll hire
you.”167
On the other hand, many individuals with temporary work
authorizations contingent on DACA, Temporary Protected Status
(“TPS”), withholding of removal and other liminal legal status
(pending asylum application, U visas, etc.) continue to experience
discrimination from employers who do not understand or are
deliberately indifferent to their work authorization.168 The very
complexity of immigration law, particularly as it interacts with
underlying biases against those perceived to be “illegal,” undercuts the
protections that authorization to work under IRCA was supposed to
provide.169

167

Interview with Dean, supra note 99.
See, e.g., Juarez v. Nw. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 69 F. Supp. 3d 364, 365-66, 374
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (demonstrating the difficulties of getting some employers to accept
DACA EADs when plaintiff successfully challenged Northwestern Mutual’s refusal to
hire DACA recipients on the grounds of their immigration status). See generally
Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 86; Jason Dzubow, Immigration Rant, GREEN CARD 4
(Winter 2016) (“Frankly, I think that most IJs and DHS attorneys underestimate the
difficulty of living in the U.S. with Withholding of Removal. And these difficulties are
not limited to practical problems related to jobs and driver’s licenses, attending and
paying for school, and the indefinite separation from family members. For my clients
at least, Withholding of Removal does not alleviate the stress of their situation. They
have fled uncertainty only to find more uncertainty. Will they be deported to a third
country? Will they lose their job if the EAD [employment authorization] renewal is
delayed? If their driver’s license expires and they must drive anyway, will they be
arrested? Can their children afford college? If they buy property and invest in life
here, will they ultimately lose it all? Such uncertainty would be bad enough for the
average person, but we are talking here about people who have already had to flee
their homelands. Asylum is a balm to this wound; Withholding of Removal, in many
cases, is an aggravating factor.”).
169 Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 86, at 286-88.
168
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The temporary nature of these protections also leaves recipients
particularly vulnerable to bureaucratic error. For example, some
DACA recipients experienced delays in their DACA renewal process
through no fault of their own.170 As a consequence, they had their
work authorizations lapse before the renewed authorizations were
issued even during the height of DACA.171 Some DACA recipients lost
jobs and many lost wages as a consequence of these renewal gaps.172
Even when there are no bureaucratic errors in the authorization
process, individuals with temporary employment authorizations
sometimes feel stigmatized because they have to show their work
authorization documents periodically instead of simply being able to
provide one time the sorts of documentation that their U.S. citizen coworkers have.173 These examples also illustrate the fragility of
temporary forms of immigration authorization, and the vulnerabilities
experienced by their bearers.
In contrast to temporary work authorization recipients, LPRs are
“authorized workers” for the purposes of immigration law, on par
with citizens in many respects. A work authorization combined with
stable, long-term residence like LPR status would substantially
improve wage and working conditions for unauthorized migrants. The
long-term nature of their status may give them much greater access to
jobs commensurate with their abilities and discourage employer
abuses associated with more transient immigration statuses.174 Open170 See Tatiana Sanchez, Immigration Anxiety: Dreamers Lose Legal Status and Jobs in
Renewal Delay, MERCURY News (Oct. 28, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.mercurynews.
com/2016/10/28/immigration-anxiety-dreamers-lose-legal-status-and-jobs-in-renewaldelay/.
171 David Noriega, Thousands of Dreamers Are Losing Their Work Permits, BUZZFEED
(Apr. 22, 2015, 11:37 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/davidnoriega/thousandsshielded-from-deportation-losing-work-permits#.rdrVpVKAO.
172 See, e.g., id.
173 SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, EXILED HOME: SALVADORAN TRANSNATIONAL YOUTH IN THE
AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE 176 (2016) (“William Martinez, who had TPS, told me, ‘I feel
uncomfortable showing my TPS, my work permit’ . . . The very documents — a green
card, a work permit — that provided status were simultaneously markers of not being
citizens.”).
174 On the workplace vulnerability of short-term visa holders, see, e.g., Kit
Johnson, The Wonderful World of Disney Visas, 63 FLA. L. REV. 915, 917-18 (2011)
(discussing the use of J and Q visa workers by Disney that lies far outside the statute’s
intent to promote cultural exchange); David Bacon, Be Our Guests, NATION (Sept. 9,
2004), https://www.thenation.com/article/be-our-guests/ (discussing the vulnerability
of temporary agricultural workers); Mica Rosenberg & Megan Twohey, Former Circus
Owner Emerges as Powerful Figure In Pipeline of Workers from Mexico, REUTERS (Dec.
23, 2015, 2:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/workerscarnival/ (discussing the vulnerability of H-2B workers).
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ended, long-term status that is not tied to particular employers is
critical if the goal is to mitigate exploitative wages and working
conditions.175
Even with their relatively robust work authorizations, however,
LPRs can still be subject to exclusions from some governmental
workplaces due to their lack of citizenship.176 Additionally, employers
can lawfully hire any qualified citizen over a lawful resident (even a
more qualified one) without running afoul of anti-discrimination
protections.177 In short, the protections offered by legal immigration
status and work authorization are not as protective as citizenship.
Finally, LPR status cannot prevent discrimination that workers
experience on account of their race and national origin or their limited
English proficiency when employers can use immigration and
citizenship status as a legitimating mask for such discrimination.178
Impermissible forms of discrimination can often be masked behind
legally permissible citizenship discrimination. Indeed, this is one of
the reasons that legalization-without-citizenship is understood by its
proponents as, and would be experienced as, punitive.
iii. Fear and Standing
Legal immigration status without citizenship also cannot fully
resolve noncitizens’ concerns either about their removability or about
their standing and belonging within their local and national
communities. Temporary legal presence has certainly fallen short in
175 See, e.g., Bacon, supra note 174; Johnson, supra note 174; Rosenberg & Twohey,
supra note 174.
176 The Supreme Court has upheld several state laws that bar LPRs from certain
kinds of work. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 71-81 (1979) (holding that
the function of school teacher goes to the heart of representative government and
therefore can be limited to citizens); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (same for
police officers). But see, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220-22 (1984) (striking
down state prohibition on noncitizens’ serving as notaries public); In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717, 722-29 (1973) (overturning on equal protection grounds a Connecticut
prohibition on noncitizens’ admission to the bar). There are also alienage restrictions
on federal employment. Under Executive Order 11935, only United States citizens and
nationals may be appointed to competitive service Federal jobs. Exec. Order No.
11,935, 41 C.F.R. 37,301 (1976), reprinted as amended in 5 C.F.R. § 7 (2018).
177 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(4) (2018).
178 One might conclude that race and limited English proficiency (“LEP”)
discrimination would be completely unaffected by a change in immigration or
citizenship status because they are independent of status. However, we hypothesize
that some of these harms will be at least partially mitigated because employers and coworkers will no longer be able to mask forms of impermissible animus behind the
racially neutral and legally relevant immigration status distinctions.
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this regard. Deferred action for a time provided recipients with
temporary protection from certain forms of arbitrary state action, and
in so doing offered a measure of psychological relief from the fear of
constant removal.179 But respondents with DACA accurately perceived
that the legal relief of DACA was thin in its protection against
arbitrary enforcement actions.180 With a new administration less
committed to shielding DACA recipients from removal, those
vulnerabilities were ever more keenly felt.181 But even under the
Obama administration, respondents were sharply attuned to DACA’s
tenuous and contingent nature.182 While certainly more protective
than mere reliance on individual ICE agents’ discretionary decision as
to whether or not to comply with enforcement priorities, formal
deferred action assessments ultimately offer no guarantee of any
kind.183 Immigrants are attuned to the risks inherent in this

179 Interview with Julie, supra note 105 (“I guess that’s what a lot of . . .
undocumented immigrants . . . uh . . . fear every day is whether they were gonna get a
call from ICE . . . like a minute later saying that ‘Oh your parents are under custody
and they’re gonna be deported.’ I guess that’s the biggest fear that I’ve felt daily and
that’s what I’ve been hearing from other friends who are in the same situation as me
that they feel — that they fear they — is not knowing when . . . ICE is gonna get —
when they’re gonna get a call from ICE saying that their parents are being deported or
they’re in the deporting procedures.”); see also GONZALEZ & TERRIQUEZ, supra note 71,
at 1; WONG & VALDIVIA, supra note 71, at 3 (discussing the increased sense of
belonging reported by DACA recipients).
180 For stories of DACA recipients being detained and even placed in removal
proceedings — and the anxiety that such actions created among DACA recipients, see,
e.g., Elise Foley, DACA Recipients Detained at Border Region Checkpoint, Attorney Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 12, 2017, 7:11 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
border-checkpoints-daca_us_59b701a4e4b09be4165765e8; Emily Goldberg, What
Immigration Raids Mean for Students, ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.
theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/02/why-was-a-daca-recipient-detained-by-ice/
517134/; see also supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text.
181 See Katherine Mangan, Undocumented Students’ Fears Escalate After a DACA
Recipient’s Arrest, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/
article/Undocumented-Students-Fears/239214.
182 See, e.g., Interview with Julie, supra note 105 (“I think programs like DACA and
[DACA+ and DAPA], they’re good and needed in the immediate sense. But they’re
Band-Aids, they are not the solution. I fear and think a lot of people fear that these
Band-Aids will just keep popping off . . . it’s not permanent. It’s like stuck in this
limbo. But you get to work during this limbo, so that’s something that a lot of people
have worked really hard for. But with the understanding that it wasn’t going to be the
permanent solution.”); see also Interview with Mireya, supra note 109 (discussing the
fragility of DACA).
183 In fact, the Johnson memo expressly disclaimed this. Johnson, DAPA
Memorandum, supra note 65, at 2.
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situation.184 Survey respondents expressed their surprise and concern
over the fragile nature of deferred action relief185 and sometimes did so
in overtly partisan ways.186 The injunction of the DAPA program also
contributed to the feeling of instability, highlighting for many
immigrants the tenuous nature of relief programs implemented by the
executive branch.187
A more stable legal immigration status would certainly offer some
benefits as compared with temporary deferrals of removal. A
sufficiently robust lawful status could facilitate family unity, travel,
and work opportunities, and thereby do much more than DACA (or
DAPA) in remedying the standing harms experienced by currently
unauthorized migrant residents.188 On the other hand, recent changes
in the law have substantially decreased even current LPRs’ sense of
stability and belonging.189 LPRs are more vulnerable to arbitrary state
action than at any point in recent history,190 and this insecurity
reverberates in daily life.191 Additionally, the relatively recent
184 Interview with Beatriz, supra note 87 (saying of the proposed DAPA relief, prior
to the injunction, “We need to take it, risk it. Even though [my] oldest son is
disappointed. He says relief is not law.”).
185 Several of our interviewees expressed their concern about the tenuous nature of
the deferred action programs in the wake of Judge Hanen’s order and the ensuing Fifth
Circuit litigation. See, e.g., Interview with Herminia, supra note 108 (“I was surprised
that a single judge in Texas could suspend an order that had been issued by the
president.”).
186 See, e.g., Interview with Margarita, supra note 96; Interview with Tomás, supra
note 91. But cf. Interview with Alondra (July 19, 2016) (transcript on file with author)
(expressing the view that the failure of DAPA was Obama’s fault because he failed to
“negotiate” with the Supreme Court to ensure its success — something that she sees
him as having been able to do with regard to the ACA).
187 See, e.g., Interview with Yupanqui, Organizer, in Los Angeles, Cal. (July 26,
2016) (transcripts on file with author).
188 This is the assumption of most scholarship on LPR status, anyway. Interestingly
there is not a lot of empirical data on the point, and it probably warrants further
research. Cf. Kara Cebulko, Documented, Undocumented and Liminally Legal: Legal
Status During the Transition to Adulthood for 1.5-Generation Brazilian Immigrants, 55
SOC. Q. 143, 144 (2014).
189 MOTOMURA, supra note 134, at 112-22; see Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are
Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 367, 374 (2013) (“[N]on-citizens are balkanized into a host of
hierarchical categories, and even the Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) at the top
cannot lay claim to many of the rights of membership that ‘declarant aliens’ enjoyed
during an earlier era.”).
190 MOTOMURA, supra note 134, at 186-87.
191 Contemporary case law provides numerous examples of the susceptibility of
long-time lawful permanent residents to immigration detention and deportation, even
on old and minor charges, and even after incredibly lengthy stays in the U.S. See, e.g.,
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legislative moves to make LPR status less “permanent,” offer an
important reminder that the legal bundle of rights associated with LPR
status itself can fluctuate in significant ways with little political
fanfare. Trump’s briefly implemented travel ban on lawful permanent
residents from seven banned countries highlights the point very
clearly. LPR status is itself a liminal legal category.192 One should not
assume that lawful permanent resident status is fixed in terms of the
rights and benefits that it encompasses. The bundle of rights
associated with legalization-without-citizenship proposals would be
less rights-protective than LPR status as it exists now. Like LPR status
today, it would also be unstable in its rights-protective content. And at
any time, citizen voters and their representatives in Congress and the
White House can retract the protections and benefits associated with
permanent resident status without formal input from foreign nationals
and with little interference from courts.
C. Conclusions
In political discourse, citizenship is often framed as a legal status
that bestows political voice. For reasons that will be explored in
greater detail below, the link between citizenship and political voice is
actually quite complex. But it is certainly the case that individuals who
are legally entitled to participate in the political process are generally

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 188 (2013) (discussing deportation proceedings
for LPR with decades of U.S. residency that began when Moncrieffe was a toddler);
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010) (depicting deportation proceedings for
LPR veteran with forty years of U.S. residency); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513
(2003) (stating that Kim had been an LPR since the age of six but was subject to
deportation due to convictions for prior criminal acts); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 684-686 (2001) (stating that both Zadvydas and Ma from the consolidated case
had spent almost their entire lives in the U.S.); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 581 (1952) (demonstrating this is not a new phenomenon, but a recurring motif
in U.S. history). The lower court and immigration court cases documenting the
expulsion of long-time lawful residents are legion. See also TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA,
DEPORTED: POLICING IMMIGRANTS, DISPOSABLE LABOR AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 143-44
(2015) (providing data on contemporary removals of LPRs).
192 Chacón, supra note 10, at 731 (2015); see Susan Bibler Coutin, The Rights of
Noncitizens in the United States, 7 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 289, 296 (2011) (“Previously,
there was a sharp distinction between the rights of legal permanent residents, who
could remain in the United States and naturalize, and unauthorized residents, who
were potentially subject to deportation. The adoption of more restrictive immigration
measures has moved this line, such that increasingly, the most significant legal
distinction is between citizens, who cannot be deported legally, and noncitizens, who
are ineligible for particular rights and services and who can be deported if convicted of
any of a broad range of criminal offenses.”).
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better able to defend their privileges than those without a formal voice
in the process. Foreign nationals who are denied formal political
participation have a harder time defending their rights and privileges
in our political system.193 The travel, work, education, familial and
status benefits associated with permanent residency are all contingent
on the political process, and residents are formally excluded from
some aspects of that process. Their rights are highly dependent on the
will of a majority of whom they can form no part.
Thus, while immigrant residents would undoubtedly experience
permanent resident status as more secure and desirable than
temporary legal reprieves like DACA194 or a complete lack of legal
protection, such a status would not definitively resolve many of the
vulnerabilities and status harms experienced by immigrants. Those
with lawful status but no citizenship still experience legal barriers to
family unification, travel, and work opportunities. The legal
disabilities they experience could be enhanced without their formal
political input. Finally, given the malleability of lawful permanent
resident status itself, even a “permanent” lawful status cannot provide
the stability and certainty associated with citizenship.
In light of this fact, it is interesting to note that a good number of
our respondents did not insist upon citizenship as the necessary goal
of immigration reform, viewing it instead as a possible bonus, but not
a crucial component of reform. Their neutrality — and even, at times,
ambivalence195 — toward citizenship might seem puzzling. But in a
nation that has, for the past thirty years, withheld the extension of
citizenship to long-term residents and increasingly targeted these
residents for immigration enforcement, perceptions of citizenship
itself have been transformed in important ways.
II.

WHO NEEDS CITIZENSHIP?

The foregoing section suggests that immigration reform packages
that stop short of offering a path to citizenship would be of significant
practical benefit to unauthorized immigrants. It also suggests that
these forms of incomplete incorporation will, in some ways,
193

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
See Gonzalez & Terriquez, supra note 71, at 2; Wong et al., supra note 71, at 1.
195 See, e.g., Interview with Mireya, supra note 107 (“Citizenship . . . I don’t know.
That’s kind of tricky for me because I’ve come to resent the country itself. So I don’t
know if I would appreciate being called a citizen, mainly because of all the struggle.
But then I also understand that what I want to do, I want to do here. So, I don’t want
to go to another country to do . . . to practice anything. And so I guess that’s really
difficult for me. I don’t know. Maybe I would want it.”).
194
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perpetuate legal and social vulnerabilities. This is not necessarily
surprising, but the interviews allow us to map with greater precision
the limitations of incomplete incorporation.
What is more striking about the interviews is the extent to which
they highlight the intersectional vulnerabilities that immigrants
experience.196 They experience discrimination and exclusionary
practices as a result of their legal status, of course. But these
vulnerabilities intersect with and are exacerbated by vulnerabilities
that they experience on the basis of race, limited English proficiency,
socioeconomic status, and gender.
When the vulnerabilities identified by unauthorized migrants as
their most significant challenges are evaluated against the protective
effects of citizenship, it becomes clear that even citizenship would not
resolve some of the important vulnerabilities immigrants identify in
their everyday life. This is in part because the institution of citizenship
itself is not just a legal status, but also a social institution. And the
social aspects of citizenship directly affect an individual’s ability to
access the formal legal rights and protections of citizenship.
Historically, this has given rise to systems of second-class citizenship
in the U.S., where certain groups have been excluded by virtue of race
and gender from equal citizenship.197 These interviews clarify the fact
that as citizenship denial is increasingly wielded as a punitive weapon
and citizenship itself increasingly treated as a measure of merit, the
social meaning of citizenship is again morphing in ways that
undermine the legal protections purportedly offered by citizenship.
196 See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 140 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141-67 (1989) (defining and discussing
intersectionality, and offering it as a critique of U.S. antidiscrimination law). For
discussions of immigration status that deploy intersectional analyses, see, e.g. Kevin R.
Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4-22 (2009) (discussing immigrant interviews that
illustrate the concept of intersectionality and the role it plays with U.S. immigration
law and enforcement); Mariela Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection of
Profiteering and Immigration Detention, 94 NEB. L. REV. 963, 991-1015 (2016)
(discussing how the subordinated migrant identity makes it an easy target for
legislation designed to put more people in prison); Leticia M. Saucedo,
Intersectionality, Multidimensionality, Latino Immigrant Workers, and Title VII, 67 SMU
L. REV. 257, 264-70 (2014) (discussing the intersection between immigrant status and
exploitative workplaces); Jessica H. Stein, Coalition, Cross-Cultural Lawyering, and
Intersectionality: Immigrant Identity as a Barrier to Effective Legal Counseling for
Domestic Violence Victims, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 133, 146-54 (2011) (discussing
intersectionality of immigrant domestic violence victims).
197 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 1; SHKLAR, supra note 1; SMITH, supra note 1.
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Legalization with a path to citizenship is, of course, a more
protective and beneficial form of legalization than legalization in the
absence of citizenship, let alone the bestowal of liminal status
protections. This discussion is not intended to call into question that
basic point, which is clearly articulated in the earlier sections of this
article. On the other hand, this discussion does illustrate the
incomplete nature of formal citizenship’s protective effects. More
crucially, it reveals how some of the policy tradeoffs that have become
unquestioned prerequisites to legalization with a path to citizenship —
namely, substantially increased interior enforcement coupled with
restrictive notions of citizenship worthiness — will further undermine
citizenship’s protective effects.
Using the same typology of vulnerabilities set forth in Part I, section
II.A draws on our interview data to assess what noncitizens perceive as
the potential benefits of citizenship, and then maps these perceptions
against the reality reflected in the experiences of immigrants. This
analysis illustrates the ways in which citizenship itself sometimes
suffices and sometimes falls short as a means of assuaging some of the
principle hardships attributed by noncitizens to their immigration and
citizenship status. Part B discusses in three parts the broader
theoretical implications of these findings for understandings of
citizenship. The first subsection explores how our interview
participants’ experiences illustrate the contingent nature of
citizenship. The second subsection frames these findings in the
context of ongoing discussions around comprehensive immigration
reform. The final subsection draws more general theoretical
conclusions about the ways in which citizenship benefits are
constrained by immigration law’s exclusions. These exclusions
structure both the protections offered by formal juridical citizenship
and the shared social meaning of citizenship.
A. The Promise and Limits of Citizenship
As a practical matter, citizenship would provide a much stronger
means of addressing the vulnerabilities of greatest concern to the
immigrants that we interviewed than would lawful residence. At the
same time, our discussions of these vulnerabilities with interview
respondents highlight the shortcomings of citizenship as a guarantor
of equality. The ways that citizenship would and would not address
particular vulnerabilities are explored below.
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Status and Belonging

When asked explicitly about whether they desired U.S. citizenship,
respondents reacted in different ways. Some were quite enthusiastic
about the possibility.198 These respondents’ enthusiasm appeared to
stem primarily from their perceptions that citizenship would facilitate
reunification with family and improve their social standing and sense
of belonging.
One young Korean DACA recipient said that citizenship was
important to him first for “being accepted. I guess the main thing.” He
continued, “I guess — well there’s lots of reasons why [citizenship]
would be the ultimate goal and personally for me, it would be, being
accepted. The second would be, this is where I call home, and to —
and for people to — say that ‘this is not your home; you’re just a
foreigner,’ that’s very detrimental . . . . [S]ince DACA is temporary I
still have to reapply, pay money, still live in fear of not being accepted,
not being granted status. So if I am a U.S. citizen I no longer have to
live in fear and the same goes for my family.”199 This young man,
whose nuclear family lives in the U.S. with him and who has no
children of his own, valued citizenship primarily because it would
offer him a greater sense of belonging, stability in the workplace, and
freedom from the fear of his own and his family members’ potential
deportation.200
Although they hoped citizenship might enhance their status and
belonging, respondents did not view citizenship as a necessary
condition for political participation. This was not because they were
indifferent to political participation — quite the contrary. Many
respondents are already actively engaged in community organizing
and other political mobilization efforts, particularly with regard to
immigration issues.201 But they viewed robust political participation
198

See, e.g., Interview with Alondra, supra note 89.
Interview with Dean, supra note 99.
200 Id; see also Interview with Bryce, in Orange County, Cal. (May 13, 2015)
(transcript on file with author) (discussing citizenship as a means of aligning legal
status with his own identity).
201 See, e.g., Interview with Karina, supra note 144; Interview with Samuel, DACA
ineligible (July 26, 2016) (transcript on file with author); Interview with Joaquin,
Guatemalan DACA recipient (July 28, 2016) (transcript on file with author); see also
Interview with Cora, supra note 120 (discussing the political mobilization of
undocumented parents in public school governance); Interview with Yupanqui, supra
note 187 (discussing the political mobilization of undocumented residents of Los
Angeles through his organization). In this regard, our respondents may not be
representative of their levels of political engagements. We identified these individuals
because of their contact with immigrant-serving organizations, and most of the
199
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not only as a possibility but as a necessity, even in the absence of
formal legal status.202 While a number of respondents expressly
referenced voting as a benefit of citizenship,203 few viewed political
participation as confined to voting, and many were actively engaged
politically from outside of the voting system.
A few immigrants mentioned greater access to state or federal
welfare benefits or income security programs as a desired benefit of
either lawful status or citizenship.204 Health and retirement benefits
and access to workers compensation came up in several interviews.
Although many respondents mentioned struggles with their health —
often precipitated by their physically demanding and dangerous work

respondents we interviewed had worked with or received services from the
organizations in our survey most focused upon mobilizing noncitizens in support of
legal change. But it is striking to see the high levels of civic engagement among these
undocumented residents.
202 On this point, see, for example, the promotional materials designed by the
immigrant justice organization “United We Dream” which encourages youth to apply
for DACA status so that they can become politically involved. They are not suggesting
voting — they are simply making the obvious point that people who are less fearful
about deportation can more overtly engage in community organizing and
mobilization. Our Work, UNITED WE DREAM, https://unitedwedream.org/our-work/.
And many DACA-mented youth are very politically active. See, e.g., discussion of
Daniela Vargas’s activism, supra note 155. So are some individuals who do not qualify
for DACA but who have persuasive claims of belonging. See generally JOSE ANTONIO
VARGAS, DEAR AMERICA: NOTES OF AN UNDOCUMENTED CITIZEN (2018) (describing his
life as an undocumented immigrant).
203 See, e.g., Interview with Herminia, supra note 108 (discussing voting as
something that would be nice).
204 Several respondents mentioned the “benefit” of opportunities for their children,
although it is not clear whether they were referencing access to public education or
the relatively broad array of educational and employment opportunities available in
the U.S. as compared to their home countries. Others noted that citizenship carried
with it certain government welfare benefits, but expressed no strong interest in
securing those benefits for themselves. See, e.g., Interview with Oralia, supra note 88
(noting the earned benefits that citizens accrue prior to retirement, but also indicating
her willingness to make do without them). The age of immigrant residents might
influence their views on the relative importance of welfare benefits. The unauthorized
population skews young relative to the general population. It could be that younger
people are less focused on the health and welfare concerns that will actually be more
important to them as they grow old. Older respondents were more likely to discuss
health care and retirement benefits as an important advantage of citizenships. See, e.g.,
Interview with Alondra, supra note 89 (discussing the fears accompanying a lack of
medical insurance); Interview with Oralia, supra note 88 (discussing the lack of care
during Oralia’s hospital visit). Some young respondents noted their parents’ struggles
with getting good healthcare. See Interview with Mireya, supra note 107 (discussing
her mother’s struggles to access and pay for quality healthcare).
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in the U.S.205 — they did not frame health benefits as an entitlement,
but as a desired privilege that they recognized would only come with
citizenship.206 The mismatch between their needs and their expressed
desires about citizenship suggest that their reticence on this point may
be less a reflection of their practical needs and preferences and more
an indicia of the powerful containing force of citizenship-worthiness
discourse.207
Whether intentionally or not, respondents avoided triggering
stereotypes about immigrants coming to the country to take advantage
of welfare benefits. Indeed, some respondents engaged this topic
preemptively and articulated the neoliberal argument that they wanted
the opportunity to work, not to access benefits.208 And immigrants are
already fighting for basic status, making other benefits less important
in the hierarchy of their needs.209 In this political moment, it is
dangerous for almost anyone to lay claim to state welfare (such as it
is); for immigrants, such claims are heavily discouraged.210 Perhaps
this is why even those who articulated the desire for benefits carefully
framed them as earned.211 Thus, ironically, some immigrants
205 See, e.g., Interview with Fatima, supra note 97 (discussing workplace injury);
Interview with Enrique, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Aug. 29, 2016) (transcript on file with
author) (stating “I am ready to retire because I have problems with my waist. Yes, I
got hurt when I was working for the maintenance company,” and noting that he
accepted a lowball settlement for the injury because of his lack of status).
206 See, e.g., Interview with Alondra, supra note 89. The single exception to this
general pattern was Samuel, who talked about health care as a human right, not as a
narrow privilege of citizenship. Interview with Samuel, supra note 109.
207 See discussion infra notes 256–69 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., Interview with Oralia, supra note 88; Interview with Herminia, supra
note 108 (expressing her desire for citizenship so that she can work with
authorization).
209 See, e.g., Interview with Pascuala, Immigrant Advocate, in Los Angeles, Cal.
(Sept. 18, 2014) (transcript on file with author) (“It is very difficult in the immigrant
community to get people to demand a service or a public program that they don’t feel
they ought to have because they’re still fighting for basic, fundamental needs, which
could be status.”).
210 The Trump administration’s recently proposed rule increasing the scope of the
“public charge” exclusion for intending immigrants to encompass any availment of a
vast array of public benefits neatly illustrates the point. See generally Inadmissibility
on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 196 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212-14, 245, 248) (proposing a new federal rule for evaluating
the “public charge” grounds so as to exclude immigrants who rely on a vast array of
benefits), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2018-10-10/pdf/2018-21106.pdf.
211 Interview with Enrique, supra note 205 (“I want to be a citizen because there
are possibilities for me of getting more health benefits, and because, well, I think I’ve
earned them because of the time I’ve been working here. I don’t think that they owe
me anything or that I owe them anything, but at the same time if needs be I have to
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effectively thin out their expectations as to the contents of citizenship
status in order to preserve their ability to make a claim to citizenship.
Not surprisingly, respondents who gave the greatest weight to
concerns about belonging and status were also more likely to express
their desire for U.S. citizenship as opposed to mere lawful residence.212
But while many of these respondents seemed to view citizenship as the
legal mechanism most capable of remediating their lack of belonging
and devalued status,213 they generally made claims for a version of
citizenship that was devoid of clearly articulated economic rights and
acknowledged the inequalities that persist within the category of
citizen.
2.

Family and Free Movement

Asked whether he would like to become a citizen one day, Nestor, a
young man who recently came from Guatemala and who is not eligible
for any of the current or pending deferred action programs, replied,
“[y]es, because being a citizen then you can bring your family over.”214
Beatriz stated, “I would like to be a citizen so I can bring my daughter
and family. That they are able to work, get a home, and that my
children can become professionals. That they can be a source of pride
among Latinos. That I can die in peace.”215
When it comes to traveling to see family members or reuniting with
them in-country, citizens have significant advantages over all lawful
residents, including LPRs. Citizens can petition on behalf of spouses
and children, with wait times that are limited to processing time, since
there are no numeric caps on these relatives, and therefore no visa
backlogs aside from processing time.216 They can petition for their
married sons and daughters and their siblings; lawful permanent
residents cannot.217
On the other hand, certain citizens are statutorily barred from
petitioning for close relatives. For example, individuals who acquire
resort to using their institutions when it is necessary. That is why I want to become a
citizen, first a resident and then a citizen.”).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 202–05.
213 Even the organization staff member cited above noted that citizenship would
allow him and his family to visit long-lost relatives in Korea. Interview with Dean,
supra note 99.
214 Interview with Nestor, Undocumented Immigrant (Jan. 8, 2015) (transcript on
file with author).
215 Interview with Beatriz, supra note 87.
216 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2018).
217 Id.
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citizenship by way of a finding of Special Immigration Juvenile (“SIJ”)
status cannot later petition for their parents.218 And some immigration
law reform proposals would expand bars on citizen petitions.219
Even with no changes to the current petitioning process, citizenship
offers an imperfect guarantee of family unification. Citizens are
routinely separated from noncitizen spouses. The noncitizen spouses
of citizens can be denied entry with virtually no justification.220 Those
lacking status are frequently separated from their families, removed
from the U.S. and barred from reentering for ten years for the sole
reason of their unlawful presence.221 And citizens have almost no
judicial recourse when a noncitizen family member is denied entry
into the U.S.222 These exclusions — often undertaken without any
meaningful explanation — are routinely justified in the name of
national security.223
218

See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2018).
See, e.g., Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013) (discussing bars on petitions for
registered provisional immigrant status (“RPI”); see also RAISE Act, S. 354, 115th
Cong (2017). This is only one of the many ways that the rights of new citizens will be
altered by legalization packages. See also discussion infra section III.B.2.
220 See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132-38 (2015) (finding that the
government’s citation of the statutory provision under which a citizen’s husband was
excluded satisfied the process due the citizen in the deprivation of her right to reunify
with her husband in the U.S).
221 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(II) (2018); see
also Jane Lilly Lòpez, Redefining American Families: The Disparate Effects of IIRIRA’s
Automatic Bars to Reentry and Sponsorship Requirements on Mixed-Citizenship Couples,
5(2) J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 236, 237 (2017) (interviewing and documenting
the experience of 50 of these families); BETH C. CALDWELL, DEPORTED AMERICANS: LIFE
AFTER DEPORTATION TO MEXICO (forthcoming Apr. 2019) (describing the author’s longterm interview project with deported long-term U.S. residents, including those who
have been separated from family).
222 See, e.g., Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2131 (discussing lack of judicial recourse for wife
whose spouse’s visa was denied); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 219-21 (1953); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 545-47 (1950) (discussing
restrictions on entry of an immigrant under the War Brides Act). The recent litigation
over the travel ban has potentially created an opening for “close” family members to
contest certain exclusions. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct.
2080, 2084-88 (2017) (generally staying an injunction of President Trump’s ban on
entry for nationals of six predominantly Muslim countries, but upholding the
injunction as to banned entrants with bona fide relationships in the U.S.). But cf.
Trump v. Hawaii, 13 S. Ct. 2392, 2407-16 (2018) (allowing President Trump’s
proclamation banning entrants from certain countries to go into effect).
223 See Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2146 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the
meaninglessness of the “reason” offered for Din’s husband’s exclusion on national
security grounds). The ongoing litigation of Donald Trump’s travel ban has thus far
suggested a greater willingness on the part of courts in looking behind the stated
219
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Citizens can travel abroad without fear of losing status after being
away for a length of time. Theoretically, they can re-enter the country
without fear of exclusion at the border, as the immigration laws apply
only to noncitizens. As a practical matter, this is sometimes messy on
the ground.224 The international mobility of citizens is far greater than
that of noncitizens — they can leave the U.S. whenever, and for
however long they want (assuming the existence of a receptive host
country). However, the experiences of citizens in border crossings and
domestic travel are not uniform. Citizens of Latin American descent —
or, more to use the precise language of the court, those of “Mexican
appearance”225 — are sometimes subjected to immigration-motivated
searches at the hands of both federal immigration officers and state
and local immigration officials, citizenship notwithstanding.226 The
same is often true of individuals who trace their ancestry to certain
Middle Eastern countries, or who are perceived as Arab or Muslim.227
objectives offered by the executive branch for immigration exclusions in cases where
perceived animus is at play and that animus has a negative impact on family
unification. See, e.g., Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1139-40 (D. Haw.
2017) (finding that a plaintiff separated from family by President Trump’s March 6,
2017 Executive Order and raising an Establishment Clause challenge was likely to
succeed on the merits). It remains to be seen whether appellate courts will continue to
apply this atypically searching standard to the executive branch’s proffered rationale
for exclusions as the travel ban and related litigation evolve.
224 Note how the recent Yemeni-American passport revocation cases shed light on
the contingency of citizenship in this regard. See Ramzi Kassem, Passport Revocation as
Proxy Denaturalization: Examining the Yemen Cases, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2099, 2101
(2014).
225 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975); see also United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 571-72 (1976); Johnson, supra note 111, at
331-32.
226 See AARTI KOHLI ET AL., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1-4, 13 (2011), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf; Johnson, supra note 111, at 331-32;
Letter from Tom Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Bill Montgomery, Maricopa Cty.
Dist. Attorney 1, 2 (Dec. 15, 2011) (on file with U.S. Dep’t. of Justice); see also
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 572 (finding that the vast majority of those stopped at an
interior immigration checkpoint were of Mexican descent, and that most of those
individuals were lawfully present, but upholding the continued use of race as the basis
for stops at interior immigration checkpoints).
227 See, e.g., Sarah Abdurrahman, My Detainment Story, Or: How I Learned to Stop
Feeling Safe in My Own Country and Hate Border Agents, ON THE MEDIA (Sept. 19,
2013), http://www.onthemedia.org/story/my-detainment-story-or-how-i-learned-stopfeeling-safe-my-own-country-and-hate-border-patrol/ (describing Muslim travelers
being detained, without explanation, by U.S. border patrol); see also Kassem, supra
note 224, at 2101; Emma Graham-Harrison, U.S. Border Agents Ask Muhammad Ali’s
Son: ‘Are you a Muslim?,’ THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2017, 12:19 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/25/muhammad-ali-son-detained-questioned-us-
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More broadly, the Supreme Court has concluded that there is no
fundamental constitutional right to international travel, so restrictions
on such travel need only survive rational basis review.228
Citizens technically should be freed of many of the restrictions on
internal mobility that are experienced by unauthorized residents. Yet
the protections of citizenship are imperfect in this regard, too. Some
citizens still run up against limits on internal mobility. Many of our
respondents took note of this fact and understood that while their
immigration status made them vulnerable to exploitation and removal,
they were policed on the basis of their perceived immigration status,
which was linked to race, not legal status. For example, Erasmo
observed the police targeting Latinos and using this profiling to
perform the auto stops that were the necessary precursor to license
checks.229 At a time when unauthorized residents were barred from
obtaining driver’s licenses, targeting these residents could provide
revenue for police departments in the form of fines and fees. But since
immigration status is not evident based on appearance, immigrants
were often stopped as part of efforts that targeted Latinos regardless of
immigration status, and this included citizens. For example, Erasmo
told us “They detain because they see me as Latino — not — because
they don’t know your status yet whether you’re an immigrant or not.
I’ve seen people who are Latino, who have their license. They’re not
immigrants and they’ve been pulled over. The first thing they ask for is
the license.”230
Erasmo is far from alone in this view that law enforcement officials
use racial profiling to select targets for investigation. Several of our
interviewees referenced racial profiling as a reality of everyday life.231
border-control (discussing Muslim-American being questioned for two hours after
confirming to immigration officials that he was a Muslim). As the Graham-Harrison
article demonstrates, the problem may have become more acute in the wake of the
Trump administration’s “extreme vetting” of Muslims seeking admission at the
border.
228 See, e.g., Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1978) (upholding
denial of SSI benefits to individuals residing abroad); see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S.
222, 243-44 (1984) (finding plenary executive authority to deny issuance of a
passport).
229 Interview with Erasmo, supra note 114; see also Interview with Mario, supra
note 96 (noting that police would target Latino drivers in particular geographic areas).
230 Interview with Erasmo, supra note 114.
231 See Interview with Yupanqui, supra note 187 (condemning the LAPD officers
and the LA Sheriff’s Department, including Latino officers.); id. (“[O]ne day, [along
with the] ACLU [we] went to the police department and analyzed a lot of files and the
results were that seventy percent of the times that they stopped somebody of color,
there were no reasons to stop the person. Ninety percent of the times that they

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3627797

64

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:1

These individuals recognized that citizenship could mitigate the
consequences of racial profiling, but also know that citizenship only
goes so far in alleviating differential treatment. They understood that
formal citizenship does not protect people from discriminatory
policing,232 and most understood that, notwithstanding the diversity of
the unauthorized population, it was Latinos who were at particular
risk for this kind of profiling by local police.233
It is possible that this helps to explain why respondents did not
always see citizenship as a crucial part of legalization. When
citizenship does so little to protect against discriminatory state action,
perhaps it becomes less valuable in the eyes of potential recipients.
Of course, it is precisely because these populations are likely to be
policed more aggressively (regardless of citizenship) that citizenship
stopped someone who was white, there was a reason to stop him.”); see also Interview
with Mario, supra note 96; Interview with Oralia, supra note 88; Interview with
Nestor, supra note 214 (reporting incidents where police “see people that are not from
there, they start to put “buts” and ask them where they are from,” but noting that it
had not happened to him); Interview with Fatima, supra note 97 (describing
discriminatory encounter). Several interviews describe the profiling as based on
markers of race and class. See, e.g., Interview with Coni, supra note 96 (noting her
older vehicle as a reason police stopped her); Interview with Herminia, supra note 108
(same). But see Interview with Patricio, supra note 90 (indicating that he did not fear
the police because that if you do nothing wrong, the police will not bother you).
232 See Chacón, supra note 10, at 753 (“[D]enizen on the edge of the criminal
justice system has many shared characteristics with noncitizens given temporary
reprieve from removal and with the citizens who are policed more heavily because
they bear the visible markers of race or ethnicity that correlate to other forms of
liminal legal status. Many individuals experience overlapping vulnerabilities due to
the combination of their race, religion, class and immigration status.”); see also
CHARLES R. EPPS ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP
135-36 (2014) (documenting patterns of racial bias in investigatory police stops and
arguing that these “[p]olice stops that target minorities communicate to those
stopped, and those shielded from such stops, that some citizens are not free to move
about as equal members of society . . . . [I]ntrusive police stops carry on the legacy of
long-repealed segregationist laws: they exclude African Americans from full and equal
membership in the community.”); Kathryne M. Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping
Track: Surveillance, Control, and the Expansion of the Carceral State, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1318, 1322 (2016) (“[T]he constant surveilling presence of the criminal justice system
has several corrosive consequences, including . . . creating a kind of ‘liminal,’ ‘secondclass,’ or ‘peripheral’ citizenship from which it is difficult to escape. In important
ways, the modern criminal justice system destabilizes lives, particularly those in poor
and minority communities.”). Race is a leading driver of these patterns of exclusion,
but class, gender (including how individuals perform their gender identity) and
disability all play important roles in shaping patterns of criminal justice hypersurveillance. Id. at 1320 n.11; see also MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE
AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2-3 (2015).
233 See supra notes 148, 231–32.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3627797

2018]

Citizenship Matters

65

— with its relatively strong insurance against removal — is even more
important for them as a practical matter. This example underscores
the complexity of the bundle of rights associated with U.S. citizenship.
It does not assure equal treatment in policing. It may, at times, ensure
that some of the consequences of discriminatory policing are less
severe than they otherwise might be; at a minimum, it takes lawful
deportation off the table. But citizenship is certainly no guarantee
against discrimination.234
3.

Work and Educational Goals

Individuals who obtained legal authorization to work before or
during the study period reported that they had greater latitude to find
work commensurate with experience and to leave less desirable jobs.
DACA recipients in particular frequently commented that their work
authorization improved their employment situation dramatically.235
But immigrants with limited English proficiency and little formal
education recognized that it was not just their legal status that affected
their job prospects. The workplace discrimination and other status
harms experienced and described by these immigrants were not
simply the product of their legal status but by the combined operation
of legal status, race, class, gender and limited English proficiency.
Indeed, the plight of other low-wage citizen workers highlights the
sharp limits of citizenship as a protective force against workplace
exploitation and discrimination.236
Perhaps it was for this reason that legalization seemed to be a more
important and immediate goal than citizenship for so many older
immigrant workers. For them, LPR status would improve working
conditions in much the same way citizenship would. Most people —
234 See, e.g., KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET AL., SAY HER NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY
AGAINST BLACK WOMEN 1 (2016) (documenting and challenging police excessive use
of force against black women).
235 Interview with Karina, supra note 144; Interview with Reese, supra note 146
(discussing the better work options available to those with DACA); see also Gonzales
& Terriquez, supra note 71, at 1; Wong et al., supra note 71, at 1. One DACA recipient
noted, however, that her prior lack of work experience had resulted in a limited
employment history that continued to operate as a drag on her ability to find a good
job, illustrating how unauthorized status can have effects that outlast the status. See
Interview with Mireya, supra note 107.
236 See, e.g., Llezlie Green Coleman, Rendered Invisible: African American Low Wage
Workers and the Workplace Exploitation Paradigm, 60 HOWARD L. J. 61, 73-74 (2016)
(arguing that low wage black workers suffer many of the same problems as low wage
undocumented workers but that these workers are often excluded from the scholarly
paradigm on low wage work, which centers on unauthorized immigrants).
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whether citizens or not — are probably unaware that the law provides
anti-discrimination protections for citizens that do not apply to all
lawful residents237 and that alienage distinctions bar lawful residents
from some jobs altogether.238 Most of those we spoke with focused not
on the technical differences between the statuses but on the kinds of
exploitation facilitated by their lack of status. Either legal work
authorization or citizenship could remediate the harms that flowed
directly from employers taking advantage of the vulnerabilities created
by lack of status. But neither legal work authorization nor citizenship
protects fully against all workplace discrimination and exploitation.
B. Redefining Citizenship
One striking feature of the accounts of the immigrants we
interviewed is that they expose the intertwined nature of exclusions
that arise from a lack of legal immigration status and the exclusions
that flow from social practices around race, class, gender and language
ability. The social and legal exclusions of immigration law both mirror
and help to generate exclusionary laws and practices around
citizenship. Not only does immigration law make it harder for some
noncitizens to acquire juridical citizenship, but it also contributes to
official and private social practices that differentiate between and
among citizens and that hollow out citizenship’s protective force,
producing and reproducing various forms of second-class citizenships.
1.

The Fluidity of Citizenship

Respondents’ understanding of why they become targets of
discriminatory policing practices sheds light on how citizenship can
reshape itself depending on the social context in which it is embedded.
Exclusionary conceptions of citizenship validate policing practices
that redound to the disadvantage not only of noncitizens but of certain
citizens as well.
237 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b) (2018) (providing protections for citizens, TPS
recipients, refugees and asylees, against discrimination on the basis of citizenship or
national origin, but extending such protections to LPRs only if they naturalize within
a certain window of time, and providing no such protections for most nonimmigrant
visa holders). At least one of our respondents recognized this problem. Interview with
Herminia, supra note 108 (expressing her interest in becoming a police officer and
noting that the job is only available to citizens).
238 Considering the dynamic nature of citizenship and alienage laws, one might
query whether legalization without citizenship would also move some states to expand
or contract alienage exclusions in public employment, depending on the preferences
of a state’s dominant political interests.
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Unsurprisingly, the individuals that we interviewed split on the
question of whether police officers treated unauthorized immigrants
fairly, and their answers tended to reflect their own experiences. But
consistently, in assessing how the police treat unauthorized
immigrants, respondents included discussions of racist policing tactics
(taking action against Latinos but not whites for the commission of
the same kinds of offenses, or targeting Latinos in the absence of legal
cause),239 and police mistreatment of limited English proficiency
residents.240 But of course, many citizens have one or both of these
characteristics — being Latino or having limited English proficiency
— which suggests that many citizens may also be treated less fairly
because of their race, class, and language ability.241 The responses we
received to questions about their treatment reflected this awareness
among the immigrants we interviewed. And this awareness may, in
turn, help account for some respondants’ disenchanted view of
citizenship.242
The observable shortcomings of citizenship as a vehicle to greater
social equality and protection from arbitrary discrimination are
significant for what they portend in the event that some subset of
unauthorized residents is given a path to citizenship in the current
context of entrenched and pervasive immigration enforcement
systems. Based on past legislative proposals, it seems safe to conclude
that legalization for some noncitizens — should it ever happen — will
be accompanied by more aggressive immigration enforcement in
communities that are perceived to be home to large numbers of

239

See supra text accompanying notes 231–34.
See supra text accompanying note 234.
241 This is consistent with much of the existing literature on policing. See, e.g.,
CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 234, at 2 (discussing state violence against African
American females); CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 26 (2014) (discussing the implicit racial stereotypes built into
police investigatory stops); VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK
AND LATINO BOYS 74-75 (2011) (discussing the U.S. social system built on punitive
social control that makes minority youth feel criminalized from a young age); I.
Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 61-65 (2008)
(discussing how law-abiding minorities are disproportionately targeted for stop-andfrisks); Devon Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 96467 (2002) (describing how people of color are socialized into engaging in particular
kinds of performance for the police).
242 Cf. generally PLASCENCIA, supra note 15 (offering an ethnographic and historical
account to advance the claim that the process of the acquisition of citizenship for
Mexican immigrants granted Temporary Status under the federal legalization
provisions of 1986 ultimately lead to disenchantment with the status).
240
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unauthorized residents.243 If the past is any indication of what to
expect in the future, the heightened emphasis on immigration
enforcement will mean more stops on immigration-related grounds
(whether formally or under a pretext), more inquiries into
immigration status, and more cases in which citizens are erroneously
identified and processed as noncitizens.244 These effects will be
exacerbated by official governmental policies in states and localities
focused on immigration enforcement and perhaps mitigated to a
certain extent in more immigrant-friendly jurisdictions.245
Citizens are already impacted differentially by the policing practices
associated with ongoing immigration enforcement — increased
enforcement will simply exacerbate these problems. Just as law
enforcement initiatives have altered the meaning of citizenship for
African American residents in urban communities with high rates of
police searches, arrests, and use of force,246 the increased targeting of
immigrant communities for immigration enforcement has and will
continue to alter the meaning of citizenship for members of immigrant
communities and immigrant families, including those who are legally
“citizens.”247
Perceptions of these developments might already be influencing our
respondents’ perceptions of the value of citizenship. For many of our
243 See,
e.g., Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013) (discussing federal pilot programs that
can be awarded to state and local governments to integrate new immigrants into the
community). The rollout of Secure Communities illustrates how race, rather than
immigration status, may shape how officials define their enforcement priorities in this
regard. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
87, 114 (2013) (finding that Secure Communities roll-out correlated more closely
with the percentage of Hispanics in the population than with the percentage of
immigrants, unauthorized immigrants, or indicia of crime control needs).
244 KOHLI ET AL., supra note 226, at 13; Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of
Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1596 (2010); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing
Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 131-32 (2013). For example, in the workplace,
citizens may be erroneously identified as unauthorized workers, as has happened in
the past. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE
QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 3-8 (Mar. 1990); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration
Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1116 (2008); Juliet P. Stumpf,
Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares About E-Verify (and Everybody Should), 2 UC
IRVINE L. REV. 381, 396 (2012).
245 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.b.
246 EPPS ET AL., supra note 232, at 52-53; Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition of Rights
Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887, 889-90 (2014); Young & Petersilia, supra note
232, at 1320.
247 Chacón, supra note 10, at 712.
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respondents, social standing was a critical concern driving their
interest in citizenship, and yet they were aware that citizenship does
not always translate into greater or more secure social standing in the
face of discriminatory enforcement practices.248
The changes to citizenship generated by enforcement have not been
limited to the disenfranchising effects of the practices of particular
officers — although such practices are themselves important. The
formal legal rights of citizens are directly affected by changes in the
law that are intended to enhance immigration enforcement. Concerns
with immigration enforcement have legitimated differential state
practices as against certain citizens under the law.249 They affect
political citizenship insofar as they implicate rights such as the right to
vote.250 They impinge on the core rights of juridical citizenship by
248 Indeed, these perceptions are deeply internalized. So much so that one
respondent, for example, distinguished Latino police officers from “American
Americans.” Interview with Fatima, supra note 97.
249 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY 1 (2014). What makes the search of a resident
“reasonable,” for example, is contingent upon the place. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 124-26 (2000) (holding that when a person runs from police in a “high
crime area,” this combination of facts is sufficient to justify a frisk of the person);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-48 (1972) (finding the fact that the stop
occurred in a “high crime area” among the relevant contextual considerations in
determining whether a stop and frisk is reasonable). This analytical fact is significant
and explicitly tied to racial profiling, in the policing of the borderlands. See United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975); Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I.
Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1557 (2011);
Jennifer M. Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 129, 130 (2010).
250 Concerns about noncitizens’ voting have been an important motivator for the
passage of voter I.D. requirements that disenfranchise many citizens — most notably, those
who are poor, the elderly, Latinos and African Americans. Sari Horwitz, Getting a Photo ID
so You Can Vote Is Easy. Unless You’re Poor, Black, Latino or Elderly, WASH. POST (May 23,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/getting-a-photo-id-so-youcan-vote-is-easy-unless-youre-poor-black-latino-or-elderly/2016/05/23/8d5474ec-20f011e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html. The myth that large numbers of noncitizens are
voting in U.S. elections has been promoted heavily in recent years. See, e.g., Richard L.
Hasen, Trump’s Voter Fraud Endgame, SLATE (June 30, 2017) http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/06/donald_trump_s_voter_fraud_
commission_is_itself_an_enormous_fraud.html; Jessica Huseman, How the Case for Voter
Fraud was Tested – and Utterly Failed, ELECTIONLAND (June 19), https://www.
propublica.org/article/kris-kobach-voter-fraud-kansas-trial; Amy Sherman, Following
Trump Voter Fraud Allegations, Claim That 5.7 Million Noncitizens Voted Is Wrong,
POLITIFACT (June 22, 2017, 3:28 PM), http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/
2017/jun/22/ainsley-earhardt/following-trump-voter-fraud-allegations-claim-57-m/
(alleging that 5.7 million noncitizens voted in the 2008 election). The irony is that the
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generating restrictions in the right to be documented as a citizen.251
Citizens who are documented as such may still lose the right to be safe
from formal legal banishment. Due to systemic errors that fall in
predictable patterns, citizens have been placed in immigration
detention and deported erroneously.252
Equally significantly, the pervasive surveillance and policing
practices associated with immigration enforcement broadly recalibrate
the relationship of the government and its citizens, resetting political
defaults in ways that allow for increased surveillance of all residents,
including citizens. These trends can already be discerned as a result of
the increased immigration enforcement of the past two decades,253 and
are likely to be furthered by enforcement-heavy legalization
packages254 — with or without the creation of new paths to
citizenship.
2.

“Earning” Citizenship

Our interviews with immigrants also help to reveal how the political
framing of the legalization debate is reshaping citizenship. The
problem of noncitizen voting is not really a problem at all. See, e.g., JUSTIN LEVITT, THE
TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD 18 (2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/truthabout-voter-fraud; see also Debunking the Voter Fraud Myth, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1
(2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/debunking-voter-fraud-myth; Stephen
Ansolabehere et al., The Perils of Cherry Picking Low Frequency Events in Large Sample
Surveys, CCES (Nov. 5, 2014), https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/news/perils-cherry-pickinglow-frequency-events-large-sample-surveys.
251 See generally BENJAMIN N. LAWRANCE & JACQUELINE STEVENS, CITIZENSHIP IN
QUESTION: EVIDENTIARY BIRTHRIGHT AND STATELESSNESS, Introduction 1-23 (2017) (analyzing
the ways that vulnerable and disfavored populations are excluded from citizenship and
summarizing the various case studies collected in the volume on this topic); Rachel E.
Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1965, 1993 (2013) (discussing South Texas birth certificate denials). By way of example,
Professor Jacqueline Stevens is currently documenting the Kafka-esque case of Roberto
Dominguez, a U.S. citizen who has already been once deported by ICE and who is
continuing to litigate his claim to U.S. citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (Denial of Rights
and Privileges as a U.S. Citizen). See Jacqueline Stevens, How Many DOJ Attorneys Does It
Take to Deport a U.S. Citizen? Boston Hearing Today, STS. WITHOUT NATIONS (Feb. 19,
2016),
http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2016/02/how-many-us-attorneys-andassistant.html. This is one of several such examples she has discussed on her blog — all
involving Black and Latino U.S. Citizens.
252 DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN
DIASPORA 99-102 (2012); Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining
and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 686 (2011).
253 See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2014).
254 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. § 5, 1106, 2103-11, 3104, 3303, 3409, 4411-12 (2013).
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dominant frame for political discussions of immigration reform is one
that posits citizenship as an earned right. Although themes of mercy
and justice (particularly transnational justice) are deployed alongside
this frame, they do not drive either the popular or the political
discourse. No mainstream politicians are talking about a possible
“amnesty” for the eleven million unauthorized migrants currently
present in the United States. Supporters of mass deportation for these
noncitizens certainly do not support amnesty for noncitizens.255
Supporters of large-scale legalization without citizenship eschew
amnesty on the debatable grounds that granting citizenship to
someone with a period of unauthorized presence undermines the rule
of law.256 But even those who support a path to citizenship for some
unauthorized residents now refrain from labeling such a plan
“amnesty.” Nor do they frame legalization as an imperative of human
dignity. Instead, tapping into the neoliberal zeitgeist, many
immigration reform proponents have joined politicians in reframing
the citizenship proposal not as an “amnesty” but as “earned
citizenship.”257 Immigrants who are sufficiently hard-working258 and
law-abiding earn the right to be a citizen.
Former President George W. Bush supported such a path to “earned
citizenship” when calling for the passage of comprehensive
immigration reform, and he urged that “[w]e need to resolve the
255 The opposition to amnesty is interesting given that immigration law incorporates
a number of small-scale amnesties that are a part of the fabric of the law. Some of them
— such as the T visa and the VAWA self-petition provisions — are bipartisan legislative
achievements of recent vintage. MOTOMURA, supra note 7, at 196-97.
256 Bush and Bolick, for example, would require individuals to plead guilty to
unauthorized entry — which would not make sense for the nearly half of unauthorized
residents who entered lawfully and overstayed — to pay fines or do community service
and then to begin to “earn” lawful residence which could never lead to citizenship.
Ignoring the many lawbreaking individuals who have already gained or were born with
citizenship, they maintain that “[i]t must be a basic prerequisite for citizenship to
respect the rule of law.” BUSH & BOLICK, supra note 37 at 43.
257 See, e.g., Calling for Comprehensive Immigration Reform Which Promotes the
Reunification of Families, Provides Legal Status with a Path to Earned Citizenship, and a
Plan for Current and Future Immigrant Workers, U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS (June 20–24, 2008),
https://www.usmayors.org/the-conference/resolutions/?category=c962&meeting=
76th%20Annual%20Meeting; Taking Action on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/immigration/earned-citizenship (last visited Aug.
16, 2018). The Democratic party platform favored “earned citizenship” in 2012. See
Immigration Highlights from the Republican and Democratic Party Platforms, AILA (Sept. 5,
2012), http://www.aila.org/infonet/2012platforms (last visited Feb. 14, 2016); see also
Shannon Gleeson, ‘They Come Here to Work’: An Evaluation of the Economic Argument in
Favor of Immigrant Rights, in 19 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 400, 410 (2015).
258 Gleeson, supra note 257, at 429.
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status of the illegal immigrants who are already in our country without
animosity and without amnesty.”259 President Obama followed suit. In
his 2012 State of the Union address, he urged:
We should be working on comprehensive immigration reform
right now. But if election-year politics keeps Congress from
acting on a comprehensive plan, let’s at least agree to stop
expelling responsible young people who want to staff our labs,
start new businesses, defend this country. Send me a law that
gives them the chance to earn their citizenship. I will sign it
right away.260
He continued to use the phrase throughout his administration.261
Various groups advocating comprehensive immigration reform have
used the term as well.262
Advocates for more limited paths to citizenship for students who
arrived in this country as children have also tapped into this rhetoric
of earning and worthiness,263 although the putative beneficiaries of
those efforts do not always embrace the worthiness rhetoric.264 This
259 George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 23, 2007), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=24446#ixzz1ph5absu8.
260 Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in State of the
Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/
24/remarks-president-state-union-address (emphasis added).
261 In his next State of the Union Address in January 29, 2013, President Obama
again urged:

[W]e have to deal with the 11 million individuals who are here illegally. We
all agree that these men and women should have to earn their way to
citizenship. But for comprehensive immigration reform to work, it must be
clear from the outset that there is a pathway to citizenship. We’ve got to lay
out a path — a process that includes passing a background check, paying
taxes, paying a penalty, learning English, and then going to the back of the
line, behind all the folks who are trying to come here legally. That’s only fair,
right?
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on Comprehensive
Immigration Reform (Jan. 29, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/29/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform. The right to
“earn” citizenship features as a recurring part of President Obama’s stump speech on
immigration reform and is featured on the White House website.
262 Ahmad, supra note 19, at 272 n.61, 273 n.67.
263 Keyes, supra note 139, at 920-24 (observing and critiquing the deployment of
the “worthiness” framework adopted by some proponents of the DREAM Act).
264 Abrams, supra note 139, at 728; Abrams, supra note 139, at 8-10; Gonzalez &
Terriquez, supra note 71, at 2 (all arguing that immigrant youth activists have
challenged and subverted the worthiness framework in important ways); see also
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desire to reward the “good immigrant” not just to the exclusion of, but
also at the expense of the “bad immigrant,” was also embodied in
President Obama’s assertion that his immigration policies are designed
to help “families,” not “felons,” and “mother[s]” not “gangbangers.”265
In trading off the security of long-time residents who fail to fit
aspirational citizenship criteria, for the citizenship (or, in the case of
DACA and DAPA, the more limited immigration relief) of the most
“worthy” subjects, these plans provide a visible example of the work
that “supercitizen immigrants” are doing in our citizenship debates.
Bonnie Honig described the frequently recurring appearance of the
supercitizen immigrant in American political discourse in this way:
Neither needy nor threatening, as such, but always mirrored
by and partnered with those others, the supercitizen
immigrant is the object of neither American hostility nor
charity but outright adoration. The stereotypically weak
immigrant and the stereotypically powerful one both elicit
disavowal. But the supercitizen immigrant is an object of
identification. He is the screen onto which we project our
idealized selves. He works harder than we do, he values his

Interview with Eleana, in Orange County, Cal. (Nov. 24, 2014) (transcript on file with
author) (noting the refusal of many unauthorized Asian youth to adopt or deploy
model (immigrant) minority stereotype); Interview with Reese, in Orange County,
Cal. (Mar. 20, 2015) (transcript on file with author) (DACA is “like a model minority
of a whole new level”); Interview with Carla, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 20, 2014)
(transcript on file with author) (observing and critiquing the different narratives
applied to “DREAMERs” compared to everyone else); see also Interview with Karina,
in Orange County, Cal. (May 6, 2015) (transcript on file with author) (discussing her
disappointment that DAPA would not cover her parents even as it covered her laterarriving aunt because her parents have only undocumented children).
265 President Obama promoted this problematic dichotomy in announcing the
DAPA program in November 2014:
Even as we are a nation of immigrants, we’re also a nation of laws.
Undocumented workers broke our immigration laws, and I believe that they
must be held accountable — especially those who may be dangerous. That’s
why, over the past six years, deportations of criminals are up 80 percent.
And that’s why we’re going to keep focusing enforcement resources on
actual threats to our security. Felons, not families. Criminals, not children.
Gang members, not a mom who’s working hard to provide for her kids. We’ll
prioritize, just like law enforcement does every day.
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in Address to the
Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration (emphasis added).
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family and community more actively than we do, and he also
fulfills our fantasy of membership by way of consent.266
The earned citizenship story and the mainstream political narrative
constructed around DREAMers267 places the supercitizen immigrant at
its core. The trope generates a political compromise that centers and
rewards only the ideal (super)citizen (perhaps with citizenship,
perhaps with less) while spurring on harsh treatment of those who fall
short. The citizenship debates themselves might be seen as a form of
neoliberal governmentality268 pushing noncitizens to “govern
themselves” into supercitizenship. This may help to explain our
respondents’ hesitance to talk about their desire for government
assistance, and also helps to account for their own insistence that they
have earned citizenship through their hard work and assimilationist
efforts.
The reluctance of some individuals seeking legal status to treat
citizenship as a means of accessing a shared social safety net both
mirrors and amplifies the dominant discourse of citizenship — one
that recasts citizenship as a narrower “freedom from” certain
oppressive exclusions, with little or no affirmative rights-bestowing
content. The politics of respectability limits the imaginative
possibilities of citizenship.269 At the same time, the guarantees of
citizenship as a form of freedom from arbitrary and unfair
governmental actions is reduced by the emphasis on enforcement
practices that form the other side of the coin of earned citizenship.
Harsh and discriminatory practices that affect citizens and noncitizens
alike become normalized even as, ironically, they undercut the
fundamental protective functions of citizenship.270 Honig might
266

BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 67-68 (2001).
Keyes, supra note 139. But note the contestation of this merit-based rights
claiming. See Interview with Bryce, supra note 200; Interview with Josue, supra note
105; Interview with Karina, supra note 144.
268 WENDY BROWN, EDGEWORK: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 42-44
(2005) (describing the workings of neoliberal governmentality).
269 Cf. EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, RIGHTEOUS DISCONTENT: THE WOMEN’S
MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK BAPTIST CHURCH 1880–1920, at 186-87 (2001) (introducing
the concept of the politics of respectability in the context of African American
community). One of our interviews with a mother and daughter exposed
intergenerational differences around these questions within the same family, with the
mother advocating for piecemeal reform that favored more popular immigrant groups
and the daughter explicitly rejecting the embrace of a “politics of respectability.”
Interview with Alondra, supra note 186; Interview with Carla, in Los Angeles, Cal.
(July 19, 2016) (transcript on file with author).
270 Cf. Keramet Reiter & Susan Bibler Coutin, Crossing Borders and Criminalizing
267
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diagnose this as the ever-present xenophobic alter ego of the
xenophilia that gives rise to the arguments in favor of “earned
citizenship” for DREAMers and other supercitizens.271
In short, the framing of the immigration debate has been a force that
has recalibrated what we can expect from citizenship. This has
implications not just for conceptualizing the politics of immigration,
but also for understanding citizenship more generally.
3.

Rethinking Citizenship Theory

The common tale of U.S. citizenship is that it is relatively easily
acquired, and that (perhaps consequently) it guarantees very little.
Barriers to entry are relatively low, and the bundle of rights associated
with citizenship is relatively small. In this common telling, the United
States rejects ethno-nationalist notions of citizenship. Citizenship is
open to all comers and — at least since 1965 — this has been reflected
in immigration and nationality laws that nominally afford citizens of
all nations, races, and creeds equal opportunity to immigrate and to
become U.S. citizens.
The truth of U.S. citizenship has always been more complicated.
U.S. citizenship has a deep ethno-nationalist past that extends its
tentacles into the present. Citizenship has been more accessible and
less exclusive than in many other societies, but it has also been a tool

Identity: The Disintegrated Subjects of Administrative Sanctions, 51 L. & SOC’Y REV. 567,
595-96 (2017).
[W]ith the rise of the administrative state, citizens and the nonincarcerated
also become administrative subjects, but perhaps un-actualized ones. The
boundaries that the state places around those deemed “the worst of the
worst” are porous and unclear. Therefore, there is a sense in which anyone
— particularly young people of color — could be swept away through
policies that identify youth as gang members or Latinos as “illegals.” In fact,
U.S. citizens have been mistakenly deported, and young people who are not
gang members have nonetheless ended up on police lists, and in solitary
confinement. The breadth of this potential criminalization and illegalization
may help to explain the link between punitive-ness and nativism, because
citizens and the non-incarcerated may fear being excluded so much that they
therefore work to distinguish themselves from criminals and the
undocumented. This work can include denigrating “felons” and “illegals,” as
occurs all too often through private fears and in public debates. As a result,
the disintegrated subject that lies at the center of these new hybrid civilcriminal laws, trapped in the space of non-existence may be none other than
the citizen who used to think that s/he had rights.
271

HONIG, supra note 266, at 68.
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of racial exclusion and racial privilege,272 and, relatedly (albeit in
distinctive ways) a tool of conquest.273 Consequently, the institution of
citizenship has played a fundamental role in creating racial meaning
and inscribing racial hierarchies in the United States.274
Nor has citizenship itself ever promised a neat and uniform bundle
of rights. Some citizens have been denied rights that might be seen as
fundamental rights of citizens — as when all women and African
American men were systematically denied the right to vote.275 Just as
racial exclusions helped to create and sustain racial hierarchies, the
unevenness of citizenship’s protections has constructed social
hierarchies as well. Citizenship rights in the U.S. may indeed be
relatively thin, but it is important to recognize that they have never
been uniform either.
These realities have bedeviled citizenship theory for some time. To
explain what he saw, T.H. Marshall famously offered a territorially
bounded notion of citizenship that evolved through history — one
that initially encompassed civil rights, and that evolved through the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to more fully encompass political
and social rights.276 The normative gist of Marshall’s argument is that
true democratic citizenship cannot be realized until every citizen is
endowed with the full array of rights.277 For Marshall, formal legal
citizenship ought to be “full citizenship” in its social, political and
cultural dimensions. This aspirational vision of “full” citizenship is
shared to some degree by many social democratic theorists.278
But this notion of citizenship — statist, territorial, rights-based,
bounded and dialectic — is contested on all sides. Civic republicans279
272 See United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 208 (1923); Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 517-18 (1857); see also HANEY-LÓPEZ, supra note 41, at 1.
273 See Bethany Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591,
603-04 (2009) (discussing the use of citizenship as a tool of conquest); see also LAURA
E. GÓMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE 136-38
(2007) (exploring the role that grants of U.S. citizenship and statehood played in
defining U.S. racial categories and shaping U.S. racial hierarchy).
274 HANEY-LÓPEZ, supra note 41, at 2-7, 13.
275 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1966) (reviewing the long
line of state efforts to disenfranchise African American voters); Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. 162, 170-72 (1875) (affirming the constitutionality of the exclusion of women
from the franchise).
276 T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS BY T.H.
MARSHALL 78 (1965).
277 Id. at 77, 93.
278 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 69-80 (1980);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 171 (1991).
279 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, book III, ch. 1 at 125-26 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943).
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and communitarians280 argue for an understanding of citizenship
defined in terms of participation or community relations respectively,
and not in terms of state-granted rights and protections. Between or
perhaps beyond these theoretical groupings lie accounts of citizenship
as an iterative product of reciprocal exchange between “citizen” and
“state” in which contextual notions of rights and obligations emerge
discursively — an idea once associated mainly with ethnocentric
notions of citizenship,281 but one that has been reimagined
pluralistically.282
As Elizabeth Cohen has observed, all of these versions of citizenship
theory suffer from an overarching shortcoming. Namely, the “is” of
citizenship has often been ignored in favor of the “ought.” Theorists
elaborate normative visions of citizenship that do not map onto the
actual workings and lived experience of citizenship in liberal
democracies.283 To maintain the integrity of theory, apparent
imperfections in citizenship are either disregarded or are presented as
examples democratic failures.284 And while many elisions and
exclusions certainly do evince democratic failure, this is not always the
case. Citizenship will inevitably take a multiplicity of forms in liberal
democratic societies. 285 It is neither sensible nor theoretically helpful
to think of all the imperfect instantiations of citizenship as democratic
glitches. As Cohen persuasively argues, liberal norms, democratic
norms, and administrative governmental imperative necessarily
circumscribe and bisect citizenship in ways that inevitably produce
differentiated citizenships or “semi-citizenship” with variable bundles
of rights.286 Far from exceptional or rare, these semi-citizenships are
ubiquitous (and they are not necessarily always undesirable).
Emerging literature on citizenship accordingly attempts to grapple
in more complex ways with the question of how citizenship truly
unfolds. This literature accepts the known fact that formal juridical
citizenship is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive as a category

280 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
109-10 (1991); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 202 (1996).
281 See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 25-26 (New York & London,
M. Walter Dunne ed., 1901).
282 See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS 179 (2004); JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., 1999).
283 COHEN, supra note 1, at 40.
284 See, e.g., SHKLAR, supra note 1; SMITH, supra note 1.
285 COHEN, supra note 1 at 7.
286 Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3627797

University of California, Davis

78

[Vol. 52:1

through which to explain how rights, responsibilities, and virtues
commonly associated with citizenship are bundled, and offers new
theoretical tools to grapple with the persistence and multiplicities of
citizenships within liberal democracies.287 Cohen, for example, creates
a matrix that groups semi-citizens into four orders, and sorts among
them categories like lawful permanent residents, children, LGBT and
“cultural minority” groups.288 She recognizes that these categories
themselves are internally riven and that individuals within these
groupings themselves have differential rights bundles, and presents
the matrix as a springboard for further contemplation.
The makeup of these bundles of rights — and of citizenship itself —
are both evolving. By focusing on the experiences of long-time
residents of the United States who are legally excluded from
citizenship, this article tries to shed light on the dynamic nature of the
meaning and protections of citizenship. Existing theoretical accounts
of citizenship are often devoid of discussion of the significance of the
presence of a large, stable unauthorized population in the U.S. in
shaping the scope and meaning of citizenship.289 And yet their
presence, their inclusions, and their exclusions affect how all U.S.
denizens and citizens understand U.S. citizenship.290
Immigrant residents who lack legal status are redefining the
meaning of both citizenship and belonging through their articulated
claims-making and the practices of their daily lives. By asserting their
right to certain kinds of social inclusion regardless of formal legal
status, immigrants have generated new forms of semi-citizenship, and
more generally have succeeded in placing expansive pressure on
287

Id. at 40; BOSNIAK, supra note 8, at 122; see also Chacón, supra note 10, at 733.
COHEN, supra note 1, at 72.
289 Linda Bosniak, who notes the significance of the presence of rights-bearing
alien residents in the United States in giving meaning to citizenship, is an outlier in
this regard. See BOSNIAK, supra note 8, at 37-38.
290 In this sense, the reflections offered here are responsive to Linda Bosniak’s
critique of the artificial intellectual barriers between immigration law and citizenship
theory. Bosniak observes that citizenship theory often presumes boundedness as a
starting point and differentiates immigration law’s exclusions from imperfections of
citizenship within the bounded state. She has argued:
288

The splitting strategy ultimately fails, however, because the separation
between these jurisdictional domains is unachievable. Border and interior
are in fact inevitably interpenetrated . . . . The impossibility of splitting
citizenship means that citizenship’s contrasting normative impulses remain
directly in contention within liberal democratic national societies. In this
respect and in this context, citizenship stands against itself.
Id. at 16.
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dominant understandings of who belongs within national and subnational communities. Indeed, immigrant activists increasingly aim to
define belonging as something that operates independently of
citizenship, and that generates its own protective legal force. Rather
than focusing solely on citizenship for some, these advocates and
activists prioritize the creation of communities that value the
humanity of all their residents. They focus their efforts on reducing
the negative influence of the state in the form of over-policing and
deportation, and on increasing the positive influence of the state in the
form of education and integrative social services regardless of
citizenship and status. Perhaps, over time, their efforts will yield a new
and more inclusive and protective framework for human thriving and
dignity.
CONCLUSIONS
Immigrants recognize that citizenship is valuable, but they also see
firsthand that it is not a panacea. It does not guarantee full social
equality and inclusion. They see how individuals constructed as racial
outsiders — those who are not white Americans (or what one
interviewee revealingly referred to as “American American”291)
contend with certain forms of discrimination regardless of
immigration status.
Generally speaking, in recent years, discrimination against Latinos
has increased in jurisdictions that have prioritized immigration
control measures. Ironically, all of the comprehensive immigration
reform measures that might grant citizenship (or something less) to
some subset of the undocumented population are not only — or even
primarily — legalization bills. They are, first and foremost,
immigration enforcement bills. Immigration activist Victor Narra
famously said that the Senate’s 2013 immigration bill was not
immigration reform, but “a crime bill in disguise.”292
None of the immigration reform proposals of the past twenty years
offer a path to citizenship for noncitizens with anything but the most
minor of criminal records. All of the proposals exclude from
legalization large numbers of noncitizens with old and more minor
criminal records or with prior removals. None of the immigration
reform proposals provide a path to citizenship (or even legalization)
for most recent arrivals. All proposals, therefore, envision the
continued presence of a significant unauthorized population and
291
292

Interview with Fatima, supra note 99.
GOTTSCHALK, supra note 232, at 215.
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allocate resources accordingly; all have included a substantial increase
in enforcement resources.
In other words, any grants of citizenship will not be made in a
vacuum. They will be offered in the context of a legislative reform bill
that will deny citizenship to many — perhaps to most — of the
noncitizens currently unlawfully present in the country, not to
mention future waves of arrivants. Many of those initially eligible also
may not make it through the lengthy probationary period, particularly
in light of the intensification of interior and border enforcement and
surveillance against the noncitizens who remain or seek to enter in the
future. These legislative tradeoffs will continue to change the juridical
and social meaning of citizenship in important ways — and not just
for the newest citizens, but for all citizens.
The way out is offered by the dreamers — and by this, we mean
those people young and old, educated and not, with criminal records
and without, with and without citizenship — who are envisioning and
demanding new forms of belonging and who boldly and insistently
demand that we all do the same.
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